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The purpose of this study of 20-year trends in federal disaster spending was to 
determine whether and to what extent spending has been on the rise, and to examine 
contributing factors. A grounded theory analysis was conducted on 1,156 major declared 
disasters from fiscal years 1995 through 2014. Numerical data graphically illustrate 
budgeting, spending, and declaration trends, and policy and inertia influences are 
described. This study found an upward trend of federal disaster spending, yet one that is 
far from out of control. Research shows that 66% of major disaster funding was provided 
by emergency supplemental bills versus regularly budgeted appropriations. Half of all 
spending was on infrastructure, and hurricanes were the number one disaster type for 
federal spending. More severe storms were declared than all other disaster types 
combined, and the number of major disasters declared demonstrated an upward trend. 
The trend of rising spending and quantity of declarations was consistent with existing 
literature. Federal spending for fire, human services, post-disaster mitigation, and mission 
assignments demonstrated a downward trend as a proportion of the Disaster Relief Fund. 
Recommendations are provided to transform national thinking toward development of a 
national risk management approach to incentivize policymakers, homeowners, and local- 
and state-level funding recipients to better manage risk and improve stewardship of 
federal tax dollars. 
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The amount of money the federal government spends each year on disasters is not 
fully known. No federal agency has a requirement to track all federal disbursements for 
major disaster declarations among the numerous recipients of budgeted funds and 
emergency supplemental spending bills. Notwithstanding, federal policymakers and 
watchdog groups have issued warnings that disaster spending is out of control, and even 
reckless. The purpose of this study is to determine the federal disaster-spending picture, 
and factors that have contributed to resulting spending trends. 
Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis, this exploratory study 
examined a 20-year record of major disasters. The 1,156 declarations for fiscal years 
1995–2014 were analyzed according to disaster type and year, and by the five major 
categories of assistance in the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF): infrastructure, human 
services, post-disaster mitigation, mission assignments, and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) administrative costs.  
This study found that federal disaster spending trended up over the 20-year 
period. However, no pattern of annual increased spending was found, and in fact, 
variability was considerable; see Figure 1. This finding contradicts claims of out-of-
control spending.  
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Figure 1. Disaster Relief Fund Major Disaster Spending, FY1995–2014  
(adjusted to 2014 dollars) 
 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Hurricane Katrina caused the spending anomaly illustrated in 2005. This study 
shows that eliminating federal spending for Hurricane Katrina from the data analysis does 
not change the existence of a general upward trend of federal disaster spending. Federal 
spending in all five DRF categories demonstrated an upward trend. Surprisingly, four 
areas demonstrated a downward trend as a share of federal spending: fire, human 
services, post-disaster mitigation, and mission assignments. Infrastructure represented 























































This research revealed three types of disasters accounted for more than 89% of all 
federal major-disaster declaration spending in the 20-year period: hurricanes, severe 
storms, and fire. The disaster type using the most federal funds was hurricanes; yet, 
severe storms represented the vast majority of disaster declarations. In fact, more severe 
storms occurred than all other types of disasters combined. The rate at which major 
disaster declarations were declared also demonstrated an upward trend. 
The study found that budgeting for disasters at the national level is poorly done. 
The research demonstrates that disaster events are to be expected and are not in fact a 
surprise; yet, the federal government continues to rely on the emergency legislative 
process as the primary means of disaster funding. Congress passed more than  
$110 billion in emergency supplemental spending bills for disaster response and 
recovery. The government budgeted only 34% of all federal disaster funds spent. In other 
words, the actual cost to federal taxpayers is unrealistic. The question is whether 
persistent disaster underbudgeting creates a false impression of out-of-control disaster 
spending. The lack of adequate annual disaster funds necessitates emergency funding 
legislation, which may exacerbate the perception of rampant spending. 
This study focused on seven of the numerous factors contributing to the trend of 
increasing federal disaster spending: expanding scope and federalism, the quantity of 
declared disasters, the per capita damage indicator, government funding of property 
insurance, unrealistic disaster budgeting, inadequate tracking of disaster spending, and  
disincentives to change.  
Study recommendations to reduce federal disaster spending include the following: 
develop an annual report of all federal disaster spending regardless of funding mechanism 
to help policymakers and the public better understand where taxpayer money is spent for 
disasters; create a national risk management strategy to prioritize investments and 
maximize resource allocation; incentivize the private sector to offer insurance policies for 
high-risk areas, such as coastal communities, and eliminate federal government subsidy 
of the housing insurance market; raise the state-level per capita damage indicator to make 
it more reflective of all state or tribal government revenue and ability to respond to a 
disaster; and reduce the federal disaster relief cost share from 75% to 50% to lessen 
 xviii 
federal expenditures while reinforcing state-level incentives for geographic risk 
management.  
Finally, these recommendations are moot if change incentives do not exist for 
policymakers, homeowners, and state-level entities receiving federal disaster funds. The 
trend of rising federal disaster spending will continue if no incentives are provided that 
reward states and individuals for investing before a disaster occurs and requesting less in 
assistance from the federal government. If policymakers continue to benefit politically 
from large emergency supplemental spending bills for their constituents after a disaster, 
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The widespread belief is that spending for disasters continues to increase at an 
exorbitant rate. Lou Barletta (R-PA), the House of Representatives chair of the Economic 
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Subcommittee, exclaimed 
“disaster spending is spiraling out of control.”1 In 2015, former Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator R. David Paulison testified that federal 
disaster relief spending would continue its upward spiral without building code reforms.2 
Alarming statistics are offered in the news, from government sources, and from think 
tanks and non-profit groups that the amount of taxpayer money used to provide relief as a 
result of disasters climbs ever higher.3 If true, it is imperative to understand what is going 
on, and to build efficiencies into disaster response. This thesis demonstrates that disaster 
spending by the federal government has been on the rise over a 20-year period, but is not 
growing at an alarming rate. It also shows how spending is spread among federal 
agencies, and that no annual accounting mechanism exists for determining the full extent 
of federal disaster spending. Many factors have contributed to this increase, including 
coastal population growth, the expanding role of the federal government in disasters, and 
disincentives for funding recipients, homeowners and business owners, and policymakers 
to change the approach to disaster spending. This thesis provides recommendations to 
prioritize risk management and refine federal policies to incentivize reducing annual 
federal spending on disasters. 
                                                 
1 “Committee Leaders Introduce Bill to Reform Disaster Assistance Programs and Reduce Disaster 
Costs,” last modified March 19, 2005, 1, http://transportation.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Doc 
umentID=398753.  
2 Rebuilding After the Storm: Lessening Impacts and Speeding Recovery: Hearings before the House 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 114th Cong., 1 
(2015) (statement of Robert David Paulison, Former Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency), 6. 
3 Melanie Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 
Sustainability 3, no. 11 (November 14, 2011): 2164. 
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A. OVERVIEW 
Reducing federal government spending (i.e., taxpayer dollars) for disasters is 
raised periodically as a problem of poor management, a national security threat, and 
potentially wasteful. Despite the lack of clarity on federal government disaster spending, 
the sustainability of disaster response and recovery spending levels is challenged.4 This 
spending is characterized as out of control, spiraling, and irresponsible. Budget 
constraints and the efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars remain constant 
concerns. To understanding this spending, it is essential to examine how people know 
whether federal disaster spending is out of control, and if it is, what are the factors that 
have contributed to this upsurge.  
Answering a seemingly simple question, “how much did that disaster cost?” 
requires in actuality a complex, multi-faceted answer, if it can even be answered 
completely. Disaster costs are borne by the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, individuals, and government at all levels. The accounting for all money 
spent in response to a disaster, including from all these stakeholders, is not centrally 
tracked or managed.5 Challenges in identifying all direct losses in the private sector, as 
well as all government funding programs applied in a disaster, are well documented. 
Even so, it is known that disaster costs to individuals and the private sector have been on 
the rise.6  
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) FEMA tracks the billions it is 
allocated each year by Congress to support state and local governments, tribal nations, 
and some non-profit organizations that respond to and recover from disasters. The Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) authorizes this 
support and established the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) as the mechanism by which the 
                                                 
4 Bruce R. Lindsay and Justin Murray, Disaster Relief Funding and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations (CRS Report No. R40708) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 8. 
5 Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters, Board on Natural Disasters, Commission on 
Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council, The Impact of Natural Disasters: A 
Framework for Loss Estimation (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), 6; Gall et al., 
“Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2159, 2175. 
6 Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2159–2165. 
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agency makes this federal funding available. FEMA provides monthly reports to 
Congress of DRF spending, but this accounting does not include money spent by 
individual federal agencies with their own response authorities. FEMA also does not 
provide, and has not been directed to provide, an annual report of all funding spent on 
disasters by the federal government, regardless of source. The agency does have a 
running total of what is spent on each disaster that can be accessed by the public on its 
website.7 Other means by which the federal government funds disaster response and 
recovery are through other federal department and agency budgets, emergency 
supplemental spending bills passed by Congress to replenish or supplement the DRF, and 
emergency funding bills providing funds directly to federal departments and agencies. 
Federal departments and agencies may issue budget in brief reports that detail the 
president’s proposed budget for the current year, as well as the previous year’s enacted 
budget. Data tables are provided summarizing agency budgets by program, but are not 
reports of what was spent. Former FEMA Administrator R. David Paulison 
recommended compiling an accurate accounting of annual disaster spending.8 The 
purpose would be to enable an analysis of the disaster spending situation, and enable the 
formation of recommendations and solutions to increase the effectiveness of disaster 
spending, while effectively managing taxpayer money.9  
Disasters in the United States are managed under the long-held emergency 
management foundation, “all disasters are local.” This viewpoint represents the belief and 
the practice that initial disaster response comes from the locality in which the incident 
occurs.10 Localities affected by disaster are both geographically closest to the incident 
resulting in the quickest response time, and have a public safety responsibility to their 
citizens and visitors. Reflective of this foundation, it has been noted, “By constitutional 
tradition and by law, the responsibility for managing emergencies…rests initially with 
                                                 
7 “Disaster Declarations,” accessed January 3, 2016, http://www.fema.gov/disasters.  
8 Rebuilding After the Storm: Lessening Impacts and Speeding Recovery: Hearings before the House 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 2, 9. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, Second Edition (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 6. 
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state and local governments.11 Localities request assistance from neighboring 
jurisdictions and the state when existing staff and resources cannot meet the needs of the 
disaster response. States operate in similar fashion, based successively on local and state 
need. The Stafford Act is the law that dictates the federal approach to disaster 
management. When an affected state determines or anticipates it does not have the 
resources necessary to effectively respond to a disaster, a governor, or a tribal 
government representative for federally recognized tribes, requests federal assistance 
under the Stafford Act.12 The federal government provides relief at their request.”13 In 
2013, Congress authorized tribal governments to seek a disaster declaration directly from 
the president in lieu of conveying that request through a state, if the tribe so chooses.14 
Costs incurred by local jurisdictions and the state or tribe are calculated as to whether 
they meet an impact indicator and a per capita threshold.15 These costs support a 
determination by the president to grant a disaster declaration to release federal funding 
and resources to support the incident. 
The federal government is often referenced as the “insurer of last resort,” which 
refers to its role in providing aid after disasters.16 Understanding the amount of disaster 
assistance that state, tribal, and local governments may need to respond to large-scale 
disasters is a crucial aspect of responsible taxpayer fiscal management. The ability to 
request annual federal budget needs for disasters more accurately underpins a national 
program that supports state and tribal goals while maximizing the efficient, non-wasteful, 
                                                 
11 Martha Derthick, “Where Federalism Didn’t Fail,” Public Administration Review 67, no. S1 
(December 7, 2007): 36. 
12 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), and Related 
Authorities, Pub. L. No. 93-288, as Amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., 25. 
13 Derthick, “Where Federalism Didn’t Fail,” 36. 
14 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2015, 49 U.S.C (2015), 47–48. 
15 Office of the Governor, State of Colorado, Request for Presidential Disaster Declaration (Denver, 
CO: Office of the Governor, State of Colorado, 2015), 7. 
16 Donald F. Kettl, “How Much Can (and Should) Government Protect People from Natural 
Disaster?,” Governing, last modified June 2014, http://www.governing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/
gov-insurer-of-last-resort.html; Adelle Thomas and Robin Leichenko, “Adaptation through Insurance: 
Lessons from the NFIP,” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 3, no. 3 
(2011): 259; Bjorn Philip Beer and Johanna Hoffman, “Underwater,” Earth Island Journal 29, no. 4 
(2015): 37. 
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and effective management of disasters. Analyzing these issues leads to broader policy 
questions of whether current U.S. disaster policies reflect this country’s national risk 
management priorities. 
This study examines 20 years of data to identify trends in federal disaster 
spending. It explores how a more accurate understanding of taxpayer funding for 
disasters is needed to evaluate and support public debate comparatively regarding federal 
disaster spending. The number of major disaster declarations has increased dramatically 
since its inception in 1953.17 A correlating assumption is that federal disaster spending 
has also been increasing. When looking at major disaster declarations, the federal 
government spent $130.6 billion on disaster relief from fiscal years (FY) 1995 through 
2014.18 In that timeframe, the average annual number of major disasters declared was 58, 
and average annual spending was $6.5 billion.19 Overall, the trend was that federal 
disaster spending increased over the past 20 years, but it was not a steady rise and 
fluctuated considerably. This finding does not support the notion of out of control federal 
disaster spending. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study’s primary research question is to what extent has federal disaster 
spending increased over the last 20 years (FY1995–2014), and what has contributed to 
this rise? 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study applied grounded theory for exploratory research on a data set 
inclusive of 20 years of federal major disaster declaration spending from FY1995–2014. 
Grounded theory relies on systematically analyzing data to develop a theory based on that 
                                                 
17 Government Accountability Office, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to 
Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own (GAO-12-838) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2012), 9. 
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status Report—April 2015 Reporting 
Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015). 
19 Ibid. 
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analysis, as opposed to examining data based on an existing theory.20 Utilizing this 
approach allowed for the manipulation of the data set using multiple variables, such as 
the annual spending on declared hurricanes, the cumulative cost of public assistance, the 
spending trends eliminating extreme or catastrophic events, and the number of disaster 
declarations per year, among others. Analyzing the data according to a variety of factors 
revealed trends and observations about federal government spending for disaster response 
over the past 20 years.  
The research method included a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis examined data on 1,156 presidentially declared major disasters 
from FEMA’s Disaster Financial Status reports. Qualitative analysis consisted of 
literature research of government reports from the General Accountability Office (GAO), 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
DHS, and FEMA, Congressional hearing testimonies, and other applicable reports and 
materials from government sources, non-governmental organizations, independent think 
tanks, media organizations, and academia. Together, these sources contributed to the 
identification of federal disaster spending trends, and factors influencing spending. 
1. Selection Criteria and Rationale 
The timeframe of 20 years was selected to include enough data for a trend to be 
indicated, while keeping the sheer range of available data sets manageable for effective 
and meaningful observations. This timeframe also reflects more modern cost tracking 
methods, technological advances in disaster response, and is inclusive of both the pre- 
and post-September 11, 2001, emergency management environment. This line of inquiry 
was established taking into account the readily accessible and publicly available data set. 
The scope of the study was bounded to federal spending through the DRF for major 
declared disasters from FY1995–2014. Finally, the identified scope enabled the 
interpretation and presentation of national cost trends, regardless of disaster location, 
state or tribal response capability, or other contributing factors. 
                                                 
20 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (Chicago, IL: Aldine Pub. Co., 1967), 4. 
 7 
2. Data Sources 
The primary data source for this study was the April 2015 disaster financial status 
report (DFSR). These reports track all outlays under the DRF, including the five major 
categories of spending under a major disaster declaration: infrastructure, human services, 
mitigation, mission assignments, and FEMA administrative costs.21 Secondary data 
sources included CRS reports that list emergency supplemental bills passed by Congress 
explicitly for disaster response, and GAO reports on disaster spending.22 
3. Limits 
Federal spending for disasters is governed by law and is applicable to disasters 
that are of such severity that state or tribal governments requesting federal assistance 
attest they can no longer effectively respond with their existing resources. Examining 
disaster spending in each state and tribal government to determine spending patterns is a 
valid yet not practicable exercise for the scope of this inquiry. Additionally, it is 
recognized that the analysis of one data set does not represent all factors contributing to 
spending trends. A discussion of federal spending without a complete analysis of non-
disaster preparedness and pre-disaster mitigation grants distributed to state and tribal 
governments, for example, cannot provide a complete picture of national disaster 
spending. The reality of managing the scope of this study dictates a deep analysis of the 
described 1,156 major disaster declarations data set as one tool to contribute to a better 
understanding of federal disaster spending over a 20-year period. Future areas of study 
could examine other data sets and variables not considered in this study. 
4. Output 
This thesis documents the reasoning that led to the conclusion that although 
federal disaster spending is not out of control, a number of factors have contributed to the 
demonstrated trend of increased federal disaster spending over the past 20 years, even 
                                                 
21 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status Report—April 2015 Reporting 
Cycle. 
22 William L. Painter, Offsets, Supplemental Appropriations, and the Disaster Relief Fund: FY1990–
FY2013 (CRS Report No. R42458) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).  
 8 
when controlling for inflation. Factors that contributed to this rise are discussed, 
including the federal government’s expanding disaster scope and the associated debate on 
federalism, large federal cost share, low state-level per-capita damage indicator, federal 
provision of property insurance in hazard areas, poor disaster budgeting and tracking, and 
a lack of political incentive for change. Recommendations are provided that incentivize 
risk management and reduce federal spending of taxpayer dollars. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I introduces the problem space and scope of this study on federal 
government spending on disasters using analysis of data covering a 20-year time period. 
It defines the research question of how federal disaster spending has changed from 
FY1995 through 2014, and explains the research methodology using grounded theory, the 
data sources used, study limitations, and intended purpose of the study.  
Chapter II identifies the themes in existing academic research, government 
reports, and other literature on the topic, including disaster costs and the rising number of 
declarations; an absence of annual accounting of all federal disaster spending, as this 
spending is a moral, as well as a fiduciary responsibility that the United States has been 
ineffective in either way, and that little incentive exists to change the existing disaster 
funding policy. 
Chapter III reveals that U.S. taxpayers and the government officials do not have a 
good method of accounting for all disaster money spent from a variety of sources at the 
federal level, despite spending billions each year. Legislative attempts and successes are 
provided that aimed to address this issue. 
Chapter IV analyzes FY1995–2014 DRF and other federal spending data, federal 
budgeting outlays and supplemental spending bills, and the number of major disaster 
declarations.  
Chapter V discusses the key findings on spending trends resulting from the data 
analysis. 
Chapter VI presents factors that have contributed to rising federal spending.  
 9 
Chapter VII provides recommendations to manage risk better and affect the rising 
trend of federal disaster spending, and final study conclusions. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A review of the literature on federal disaster spending resulted in four primary 
themes: (1) disaster quantity and costs—composed of government, private sector, not for 
profit, volunteer, and community-based efforts—continue to rise, (2) neither government 
nor the public has a good grasp on just how much the government spends on disasters 
each year, (3) the federal government has a moral and fiduciary responsibility to reduce 
spending and effectively manage taxpayer dollars, and (4) a multitude of reasons can 
explain why costs have increased, but disincentives exists for Congress to change the 
national approach to paying for disasters. 
A. DISASTER COSTS CONTINUE TO RISE 
The literature is in agreement that both in the United States and worldwide, 
disaster costs continue to rise. A 2015 United Nations report identified that global 
economic losses have risen since 1990.23 The Natural Hazards journal declared both the 
frequency of and losses from billion dollar disasters in the United States have been 
increasing.24 A 2011 article in Sustainability noted U.S. losses from hurricanes and flood 
disasters have tripled since the 1950s.25 Other estimates claim natural disaster cost 
increases range from having tripled (over the last 40 years) to quadrupled.26 While 
amounts differ, the general agreement is that disaster costs continue to rise. To this end, 
criticism and alarm at how drastically these costs are increasing is not at all lacking.27 
                                                 
23 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Making Development Sustainable: The Future 
of Disaster Risk Management. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (Geneva, 
Switzerland: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015), 40. 
24 Adam B. Smith and Richard W. Katz, “US Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Data 
Sources, Trends, Accuracy and Biases,” Natural Hazards 67, no. 2 (2013): 389. 
25 Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2157. 
26 Ibid; Charlotte Baskin-Gerwitz, “The Rising Costs of Natural Disaster Insurance,” American 
Security Project Blog, October 7, 2013, http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-rising-costs-of-natural-
disaster-insurance/; Gregory E. van der Vink et al., “The Increasing Costs of U.S. Natural Disasters,” 
Geotimes 50, no. 11 (November 2015): 18. 
27 Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Ashley Nichols, and Abigail Temoshchuk, White Paper on U.S. Disaster 
Preparedness and Resilience: Recommendations for Reform, Pennington Family Foundation Series on 
Community Resilience (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 8; van der 
Vink et al., “The Increasing Costs of U.S. Natural Disasters,” 18. 
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When looking domestically, the terms “cost” and “spending” are often used 
interchangeably, yet what they represent are drastically different. A 2011 Sustainability 
journal article highlighted the difference noting that federal government disaster spending 
between 1960 and 2009 was about one quarter of actual direct losses from disasters in 
that time period.28 Federal spending, for the purposes of this study, is DRF or emergency 
supplemental legislation for major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act. The 
general understanding in the literature is that spending has increased dramatically. Yet, 
much of this literature describes cost or spending increases either very generally, such as 
cumulatively over the past 40 or 50 years, by decade, or very specifically, such as 
focusing on a few selected years or the most recent high-dollar disaster.29 Chris Edwards 
of the CATO Institute emphasized this dramatic rise in spending over close to four 
decades, “Annual average FEMA spending was $0.7 billion in the 1980s, $2.8 billion in 
the 1990s, $13 billion in the 2000s, and $13 billion so far in the 2010s.”30 A widely cited 
2013 report from the Center for American Progress faults climate change for extreme 
weather events, which have cost the federal government $136 billion from FY2011–
2013.31 
Part of the alarm is the recognition that the number of major disaster declarations 
issued each year has, for the most part, steadily increased since 1953.32 In a 2015 report, 
the CRS reviewed 60 years of disaster relief and affirmed that, “Since first introduced in 
1953, the number of declarations issued each year has increased significantly.”33 
Taxpayers for Common Sense reported a 33% increase in declarations from the 1990s to 
                                                 
28 Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2176. 
29 Jared Wade, “The Rising Cost of Disasters,” Risk Management Monitor Blog, March 25, 2011, 
http://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/the-rising-costs-of-disasters/. 
30 Chris Edwards, The Federal Emergency Management Agency: Floods, Failures, and Federalism 
(Policy Analysis, no. 764) (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2014), 1. 
31 Daniel J. Weiss and Jackie Weidman, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-Relief Expenditures 
Rise Amid More Extreme Weather (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2013), 1. 
32 Bruce R. Lindsay and Francis X. McCarthy, Stafford Act Declarations 1953–2011: Trends and 
Analyses, and Implications for Congress (CRS Report No. R42702) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2015), 1; Gall et al., Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United 
States,” 2176; Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman, The Realities of Federal Disaster Aid: The Case of 
Floods (Issue Brief 12–02) (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2012), 3–4. 
33 Lindsay and McCarthy, Stafford Act Declarations 1953–2014, 1. 
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the 2000s.34 Columnist and University of Maryland School of Public Policy dean Donald 
Kettl expressed well the prevailing sentiment of the literature when he wrote, “Disaster 
spending is up in part because disasters themselves are becoming more frequent.”35 
While much of the literature references this increased number of declarations as one 
explanation for why costs are increasing, the CATO Institute frames the argument from 
the opposite perspective. In a 2014 report, the Institute claims the availability of federal 
disaster aid, with no spending ceilings, has contributed to the increase in declarations.36 
In 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA).37 As a result, for the 
first time, the OMB reported on the 10-year average of disaster relief spending by the 
federal government. The FY2012 10-year average was $11.3 billion.38 The OBM 
acknowledged these costs were representative only of major disaster declarations, and 
omitted the highest and lowest years as mandated under the Act.39 The 10-year average 
will eventually exhibit spending trends, but it is too early in the reporting process for this 
outcome. In 2012, the GAO stated that FEMA had “obligated $80.3 billion, or an average 
of about $10 billion a year, from the DRF for 539 disasters declared during fiscal years 
2004 through 2011.”40 The GAO specified if Hurricane Katrina spending were 
withdrawn, the average would have been $5 billion.41 The report was cumulative and did 
not explicitly discuss trends in the eight-year time frame, yet the spending amounts 
provided did not indicate a trend of rising disaster spending.42 
                                                 
34 Taxpayers for Common Sense, Post Sandy: An Opportunity to Reshape Federal Disaster Policy and 
Spending Priorities (Washington, DC: Taxpayers For Common Sense, 2013), 1. 
35 Donald F. Kettl, “How Hurricane Katrina Made the Feds More Powerful,” Governing, last modified 
August 2015, http://www.governing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/gov-hurricane-katrina-disaster-
spending.html. 
36 Edwards, The Federal Emergency Management Agency, 7. 
37 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25 (2011). 
38 Office of Management and Budget, OMB Report on Disaster Relief Funding to the Committees on 
Appropriations and the Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate (Washington, DC: 
Office of Management and Budget, 2011), 1. 
39 Executive Office of the President, OMB Report on Disaster Relief Funding, 1. 
40 Government Accountability Office, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to 
Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own, 18. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 19. 
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B. UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RELIEF SPENDING 
On cost accounting, the literature suggests after more than 50 years of the federal 
government providing some type of disaster relief, an accurate annual accounting of all 
disaster spending by the federal government is not yet available. Former FEMA 
Administrator David Paulison said in 2015 that no effort had been made by Congress to 
study disaster cost reduction.43 The National Research Council emphasized it was a 
problem, as no government agency is responsible for determining disaster costs.44 The 
National Center for Atmospheric Research noted, “One reason it is difficult to assess the 
Presidential Disaster Declaration process is the lack of unified accounting for federal 
disaster costs, which are not tracked in a comprehensive or consistent manner.”45  
Much criticism is expressed in the literature that taxpayers, as well as the federal 
government, do not have good accounting measures in place to track all disaster costs 
annually.46 A 2013 report by the Center for American Progress exhibited the challenge in 
determining spending. The Center claimed the OMB’s estimates were substantially less 
than actual federal spending, that 96 programs or agencies “…appear to provide some 
sort of disaster assistance to the American public.”47 More recently, legislation has been 
proposed to help Congress gain a better understanding of the full cost of disasters to the 
federal government. Proposals include DISclosing Aid Spent to Ensure Relief 
(DISASTER) Act, the FEMA Disaster Assistance Reform Act of 2015, and the Sandy 
                                                 
43 R. David Paulison, January 14, 2015 (8:00 AM), “Pre-storm Mitigation is Key to Cutting Damage 
and Costs,” The Hill Blog, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/229252-pre-storm-
mitigation-is-key-to-cutting-damage-and. 
44 Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters, Board on Natural Disasters, Commission 
on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council, The Impacts of Natural 
Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation, vii. 
45 Mary W. Downton and Roger A. Pielke, Jr., “Politics and Disaster Declarations,” Natural Hazards 
Observer, March 2001. 
46 Federal 9/11 Assistance to New York: Part I, II, and III: Hearing before the Subcommittee On 
Management, Integration, and Oversight of the Committee on Homeland Security, 109th Cong., 2 (2006), 
7. 
47 Weiss and Weidman, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-Relief, 4. 
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Recovery and Improvement Act of 2015.48 The lack of effective data collection and 
reporting hinders effective cost control efforts.49 
C. MORAL AND FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY OF MONEY 
MANAGEMENT 
Throughout the literature was the theme of not only the fiscal, but moral and 
fiduciary responsibility that the federal government has to manage taxpayer dollars. In 
1995, Senator Christopher Bond of Missouri expressed the need for responsible spending 
in the budget climate of the time.50 At the same hearing, Missouri Representative Bill 
Emerson stated, “Our current policy of opening wide the federal checkbook to any and all 
comers each time disaster strikes cannot and should not continue.”51 In 2005, Senator 
Tom Coburn of Oklahoma stated, “Today’s Federal spending is not only irresponsible, 
but it is immoral.”52 Romina Boccia, a research fellow in budgetary affairs at the 
Heritage Foundation, highlighted the American public’s lack of faith and trust in the 
government to heed their budgetary spending and debt management responsibilities.53 
The need for effective and efficient spending of taxpayer dollars related to 
disasters was expressed in the literature.54 Coburn has said that federal spending rates are 
unsustainable, while R. J. Lehmann wrote the rate of constructing homes and other 
                                                 
48 Scott Peters, Gerry Connolly, Paul Tonko, and Steve Israel, September 18, 2014 (4:00 PM), “How 
Much Do Disasters Cost?” The Hill Blog, September 18, 2014, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ 
energy-environment/218100-how-much-do-disasters-cost; “Committee Leaders Introduce Bill to Reform 
Disaster Assistance Programs and Reduce Disaster Costs”; Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, 
Pub. L. No 113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (2013). 
49 Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2177. 
50 Intelligencer Journal, “Federal Disaster Spending Tops $120 Billion since ‘77,” March 16, 1995.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Guns and Butter: Setting Priorities in Federal Spending in the Context of Natural Disaster, Deficits, 
and War: Hearings Before the Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International 
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong., 1 
(2005) (statement of Senator Tom Coburn, Subcommittee Chairman), 2. 
53 Reducing Wasteful Federal Spending: Hearings Before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong., 1 (2015) (statement of Romina Boccia, The Heritage Foundation), 1. 
54 Ryan Alexander, “After the Flood, Another Flood,” Economic Intelligence Blog, June 11, 2015, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/06/11/texas-flood-will-test-obama-disaster-
relief-order; Post Sandy, An Opportunity, 1, 3. 
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buildings in hazard areas is not sustainable.55 A 2013 report supported this notion of 
unsustainability of the federal government paying an increasing amount for disasters.56 In 
a 2015 Senate hearing, Chris Edwards of the CATO Institute recommended abolishing 
disaster relief funding by FEMA altogether, claiming state and local governments should 
be managing disasters.57 He argued that federal disaster spending was wasteful, and 
abolishing federal disaster aid would save billions on federal spending each year. 
D. DISINCENTIVE TO CHANGE 
The literature reflects a great number of reasons why disaster costs continue to 
rise, and an explanation as to why changes have not been implemented to this end. Back 
in 1994, a Senate task force recommended examining declaration criteria, incentivizing 
mitigation measures, and increasing the use of insurance as methods to reduce disaster 
costs.58 The GAO cited a rise in disaster declarations, which means an increase in events 
for which the federal government must cover 75% of the cost.59 In the report, population 
growth in hazard areas and more active weather patterns were indicative of rising costs. 
In 2013, the Center for Economic Development and Research explained that more than 
half the U.S. population lived in coastal counties, which supports the substantial evidence 
in the literature that a majority of the population lives in high-hazard areas.60 The GAO 
has cited many additional reasons behind the increase in disaster declarations, to include 
improved weather tracking technology, increases in both population and standards of 
living, changes in federal policies, and changes in state policies, as well as states’ 
                                                 
55 Guns and Butter: Setting Priorities in Federal Spending in the Context of Natural Disaster, Deficits, 
and War: Hearings Before the Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International 
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; R. J. Lehmann, 
“Why Disaster Policy Matters,” R Street Blog, April 22, 2015, http://www.rstreet.org/2015/04/22/why-dis 
aster-policy-matters/. 
56 Sanok Kostro, Nichols, and Temoshchuk, White Paper on U.S. Disaster Preparedness, 8. 
57 Reducing Wasteful Federal Spending: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong., 1 (2015) (statement of Chris Edwards, CATO Institute), 5. 
58 Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 21. 
59 Government Accountability Office, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to 
Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own. 
60 Terry L. Clower, “Economic Applications in Disaster Research, Mitigation, and Planning,” 
Advanced Research in Economic and Management Sciences 14 (July 2013): 546. 
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increased understanding of the declaration process and requirements.61 The GAO also 
cited policy changes as a cause for a twofold increase in FEMA administrative costs for 
disasters.62  
It is commonly held in the literature that FEMA’s practice of providing grant and/
or relief funding to those without insurance, or insured at a lower rate than is required, 
disincentivizes both personal responsibility, as well as private sector full insurance 
coverage.63 It has been reported that Congress has increasingly expanded eligibility for 
disaster aid, which has contributed to increasing costs.64 The CATO Institute contends 
that the existence of federal disaster aid itself is a cause for increasing costs.65 If a state 
knows it can receive federal funding at 75 cents on the dollar, is that an incentive to 
spend state funds on disaster mitigation or preparedness?  
Many reasons are offered as to why disaster costs have increased, yet the 
literature is clear that the existing system provides little incentive for Congress to change 
the national approach to paying for disasters.66 A 2001 Public Administration Review 
article summarized the logic behind the disincentives framing the issue using Peterson’s 
legislative theory.67 It asserts politicians are motivated by reelection, and therefore, seek 
to provide favors—such as disaster funding—and accept credit for this benevolent 
deed.68 The authors contend that Congress prefers to wait for a disaster to occur, and then 
passes emergency legislation to fund the response vs. increasing FEMA’s annual budget 
                                                 
61 Lindsay and McCarthy, Stafford Act Declarations 1953–2014, 11–20. 
62 Government Accountability Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities Exist 
to Strengthen Oversight of Administrative Costs for Major Disasters (GAO-15-65) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2014), 29. 
63 Government Accountability Office, FEMA’s Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance 
Requirements (GAO-12-18) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2012), 11. 
64 Judy A. England-Joseph, Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Costs and Approaches for 
Reducing Them (GAO/T-RCED-98-139) (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1998), 5. 
65 Edwards, The Federal Emergency Management Agency, 7. 
66Amy K. Donahue and Philip G. Joyce, “A Framework for Analyzing Emergency Management with 
an Application to Federal Budgeting,” Public Administration Review 61, no. 6 (November/December 
2001): 734–735. 
67 Ibid., 730. 
68 Ibid. 
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adequately to account for potential disasters. Their rationale reflects the current federal 
budgeting process, whereby Congress does not need to compete for emergency funds as 
they must do in the regular appropriations process.69 They explain the political benefits 
of this approach as twofold, the appearance of immediate responsiveness, and through the 
regular budget process politicians, can focus on funding non-disaster programs since they 
know supplemental funding bills are a routine way of funding disaster response. 
Therefore, the incentive does not exist for Congress to change the current disaster 
budgetary process.  
                                                 
69 Donahue and Joyce, “A Framework for Analyzing Emergency Management with an Application to 
Federal Budgeting,” 735. 
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III. BACKGROUND: TRACKING FEDERAL DISASTER 
SPENDING 
Despite the fact that the federal government spends billions each year on disaster 
response and recovery, no single annual report of this spending is available. This 
omission contributes to this nation’s inability to define the perceived spending problem 
accurately. Without this number, it is impossible to know the size of the federal disaster 
spending problem, and what to do about it. This section outlines evidence demonstrating 
that the United States does not have a good understanding of all annual federal disaster 
spending, primary sources of federal disaster funding, existing reporting processes for 
spending, and both successful and unsuccessful legislative attempts to address this 
problem.  
A. THE FULL EXTENT OF DISASTER SPENDING IS NOT KNOWN 
In the late 1990s, the former chair of the Natural Hazards Center, Dennis Mileti, 
highlighted the challenge of a comparative analysis of disaster mitigation and other 
projects when he emphasized the full understanding of disaster losses are not well 
known.70 He cited a lack of standardized data and an efficient method of collection as 
reasons for the inability to perform trend analysis. Seven years later, U.S. representative 
Nita Lowey spoke during a hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight that a total accounting by the 
federal government of the $2 billion spent on recovery in New York for the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks does not exist.71 Sponsors of the failed 2014 DISASTER Act 
summed up the need for a new way of accounting for disaster spending when they 
expressed the need to understand the existence and extent of the problem before 
attempting to implement any solutions.72 The GAO has reported that concerns over 
                                                 
70 Dennis Mileti, Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States 
(Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1999), 102. 
71 Federal 9/11 Assistance to New York: Part I, II and III: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Management, Integration, and Oversight of the Committee on Homeland Security, 109th Cong., 2 (2006), 
7. 
72 DISclosing Aid Spent to Ensure Relief (DISASTER) Act, H.R. 5635, 113th Cong., 2 (2014). 
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federal disaster funding often arise in the debate over how to manage and control the 
national debt.73 Former FEMA Administrator R. David Paulison reinforced this notion in 
early 2015 when he conveyed that Congress had never directed a study to analyze exact 
costs of disasters, nor determine ways to reduce spending.74 
Both the number of agencies that spend federal funds on disasters and the variety 
of funding sources contribute to a lack of understanding of federal spending on disasters 
annually. The Center for American Progress issued a comprehensive report in 2013 of 
federal disaster response and recovery spending from FY2011–2014, which highlights 
this complexity. The group analyzed 19 individual department and agency “budget in 
brief” reports, reports from the CRS, data from the Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance, as well as supplemental spending bills.75 Yet, in an explanation of their 
methodology, they admitted to possible gaps in the identification of spending.76 Even 
with all these data points available to them, the Center stated: 
We believe that OMB’s estimates for 2001 to 2011 did not fully account 
for all federal disaster spending and that these estimates are less than 
actual spending because OMB could have omitted some important relief 
and recovery programs and agencies. The estimates included spending 
from 26 agencies or programs in 11 federal departments, but our analysis 
identified a total of 96 agencies or programs in 19 departments that appear 
to provide some sort of disaster assistance to the American public. OMB 
estimated that actual disaster-relief spending in 2011 was $2.5 billion. We 
estimate that the federal government spent $21 billion on disaster relief 
and recovery in fiscal year 2011.77 
In its conclusion, the Center admitted its estimate of spending might be conservative, as 
certain department and agency data was not available. This in-depth research and data 
analysis is reflective of the variety of potential sources of spending information, and it 
was unclear whether they missed a funding source during their data collection. This 
                                                 
73 Bruce R. Lindsay and Justin Murray, Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance: 
Summary Data and Analysis (CRS Report No. R43665) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), 8. 
74 Paulison, “Pre-storm Mitigation Is Key to Cutting,” The Hill Blog. 
75 Weiss and Weidman, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-Relief, 9. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
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admission in and of itself is problematic because it demonstrates a lack of clarity of all 
potential federal disaster funding sources. The authors emphasized that, “Currently, 
public officials lack complete knowledge about annual federal spending on disaster relief 
and recovery.”78 This statement calls into question how disaster spending is accounted 
for by the federal government. 
The criticism of a lack of understanding of the full extent of annual federal 
disaster spending is problematic in the face of calls for decreasing spending. Since at 
least the late 1990s, it has been acknowledged that we a straightforward way does not 
exist for determining federal spending. The Center for American Progress report is one 
example that demonstrates the complexity of required sources to be obtained and 
analyzed to estimate spending. In light of this lack of understanding, Congressional 
representatives proposed the DISASTER Act in 2014, which is described in more detail 
in this section. This proposal included an annual report to Congress written by the OMB 
detailing disaster relief spending. The bill was not made into law. 
The study established a lack of information on annual disaster spending, which 
detracts from a true understanding of funds necessary for responding to and recovering 
from disasters. Further, this lack of understanding has led to inadequate annual budgeting 
for disasters. Based on this study’s analysis of FEMA’s DRF reporting, combined with 
GAO information on emergency supplemental disaster appropriations bills over the past 
20 years (FY1995–2014), the federal government budgeted only 34% of the funds needed 
for response and recovery. An improved understanding of annual disaster spending by the 
federal government could improve the understanding of the needs from potential state 
and tribal governments impacted by a disaster. 
B. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COST AND SPENDING 
Before delving into sources of federal disaster spending, it is necessary to clarify 
the differences between spending and costs. These two terms are often used 
interchangeably but have distinct differences. Spending is the outlay of dollars from a 
specific source. This study analyzed disbursement of federal funds from the DRF. Cost is 
                                                 
78 Weiss and Weidman, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-Relief, 8. 
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a more accurate measure of a disaster’s financial impact because cost incorporates all 
sources from which payments are made related to a disaster. These sources can include 
local and state government funding, private sector and non-profit organization funding, 
volunteer efforts, and in-kind donations, insurance company payouts, and grass roots 
donation contributions. The insurance industry describes it as, “…estimates of the direct, 
tangible devastation caused by a hazard,” compiled in private sector industry databases.79 
These direct losses have been increasing. A common reason cited for this rise is the 
increase in hazard areas in which people choose to live, and short-sighted land 
management practices.80 The accounting for all money spent in response to a disaster, 
including from all these stakeholders, is not centrally tracked or managed.81 Therefore, it 
is difficult to determine how much a disaster actually costs. An analysis of federal 
spending from the DRF, albeit from only one source, is a useful exercise to begin to 
understand the full picture of disaster spending. Other sources are described as follows. 
C. FUNDING SOURCES 
Limits have not been set on the amount of funding the federal government can 
provide as a result of a disaster.82 The primary methods by which the federal government 
funds response and recovery aid for declared disasters is through the DRF, and through 
emergency funding bills passed by Congress. Another source of federal disaster funds is 
individual department and agency budgets. It has been documented that “the full costs 
associated with federal disaster assistance are unknown, or at least not readily available. 
Assistance is provided in many forms by many federal agencies and not tracked in a 
comprehensive or consistent manner.”83 Compiling each of these funding sources in an 
easy-to-understand annual summary would support the consistent analysis and ability to 
                                                 
79 Gall et al., “Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 2176. 
80 Emily Lehr Wallace and David R. Millar, “Beating Natural Hazards to the Punch,” Geotimes, 
December 2004. 
81 Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters, Board on Natural Disasters, Commission 
on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council, The Impacts of Natural 
Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation, 6. 
82 Kousky and Shabman, The Realities of Federal Disaster Aid, 3. 
83 Mary W. Downton and Roger A. Pielke, Jr., “Discretion without Accountability: Politics, Flood 
Damage, and Climate,” Natural Hazards Review 2, no. 4 (November 2001): 158. 
 23 
compare implications of disaster policy decisions. The following sections summarize 
these funding sources at the federal level. 
1. Disaster Relief Fund 
Each year, the OMB and FEMA develop FEMA’s annual budget request as part 
of the overall DHS budget. Part of these funds goes to day-to-day agency operations, and 
a designated amount is assigned specifically to the DRF. While the DRF is funded 
annually, any unspent funds are carried over to the next fiscal year, which is factored into 
budget requests. FEMA describes the DRF as “an appropriation against which FEMA can 
direct, coordinate, manage, and fund eligible response and recovery efforts associated 
with domestic major disasters and emergencies that overwhelm State resources.”84 Prior 
to 2012, the government considered four factors in DRF budget development:  
• DRF unspent funds  
• The monthly average of non-catastrophic disasters over the most recent 
five years  
• Monthly cost estimates of catastrophic event spending, and  
• Estimated recoveries of unobligated funds (money obligated (reserved for 
use) but was never used, as a result of project savings, scope changes, or 
ineligible costs)85  
The five-year monthly spending average was only for regular disasters; in other 
words, those below the $500 million ceiling. Inclusion of catastrophic disasters, defined 
as those with a cost of over $500 million to the federal government, was not included in 
the five-year average.86 Open spending for catastrophic disaster monthly averages was 
calculated as a separate item. If a catastrophic event had been closed out, even if the 
event occurred within the most recent five years, that spending was not included in the 
five-year average. The CRS noted that this methodology resulted in DRF budget requests 
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equaling less than half of actual spending for FY2000–2011.87 The government began 
using a 10-year average calculation of non-catastrophic spending together with unused 
DRF funds to determine budget requests.  
FEMA’s system to manage DRF spending and other funds is the web-based 
Integrated Financial Management Information System (Web-IFMIS).88 This system is 
used for salary and vendor payments, travel reimbursement, grantee payments, and “to 
account for the expenditure of public funds as mandated under various statutes, Executive 
Orders, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, regulations, and DHS and 
FEMA policies.”89 
2. Emergency Supplemental Spending Bills 
Congress can authorize emergency spending bills, also known as supplementals, 
when it determines emergency funds are needed.90 These funds are marked as emergency 
spending, and are not accounted for in annual budget calculations, which is one reason 
many have emphasized this method of funding disaster relief may not change in the near 
future. The 2011 Budget Control Act negated this claim somewhat, as it required 
Congress to identify spending offsets prior to the passage of an emergency spending bill. 
Offsets are funds that would have to be taken from elsewhere to pay for the emergency 
bill. 
A challenge in accounting for disaster spending via supplementals is that these 
spending bills are offered for the purposes of providing funds to cover disaster costs, yet 
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they are often filled with “pork barrel” projects not related to the disaster.91 The GAO 
highlighted that of the $40 billion emergency spending bill passed by Congress in 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, only $2 billion was allocated 
specifically to the DRF. This bill stated the funding was “For emergency expenses to 
respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
to provide assistance to the victims of the attacks, and to deal with other consequences of 
the attacks.”92 The GAO also highlighted that supplementals were not necessarily as a 
result of one disaster, but were enacted as a result of several incidents taken together.93 
Congress has been criticized for a lack of financial discipline for potential abuse and 
driving up spending related to these emergency spending bills.94 
3. Department and Agency Budgets 
Another funding source for disasters at the federal level is individual departments 
and agency budgets. When a disaster is declared, activities within the National Response 
Framework are implemented, whereby federal agencies are tasked with mission 
assignments by FEMA to execute to support response activities.95 Taskings to federal 
agencies are done in this manner to specify the activity to be performed, the timeframe 
for execution, and to provide the funding through the DRF to cover those specified 
activities. As the author explains in subsequent sections, federal agencies can and do 
spend funds from their budgets under their own authorities for disaster response and 
recovery.96 If an agency is tasked by FEMA to support a major disaster response, that 
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agency can recoup the costs of conducting its activities. As noted later in this chapter, 
only five percent of major disaster spending over the past 20 years has gone to tasking 
other federal agencies through a mission assignment. The amount that federal agencies 
have spent independently and not part of a mission assignment is research for a future 
study, as it is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Regardless, it brings to light the point that 
this spending amount is not easily determined. Even a spending report by the GAO was 
criticized for an inadequate accounting of federal disaster dollars spent, by 
underestimating spending by close to $20 billion.97 The fact that the GAO numbers could 
be construed as an estimate is in itself telling. 
Some agencies have inherent authorities and responsibilities for disaster response 
and recovery that are paid for out of each agency’s budget. For example, the U.S. Coast 
Guard has several authorities granted to it that do not require a mission assignment to be 
executed.98 The Coast Guard emphasizes its “unique position in the Nation; as a military, 
law enforcement, and first responder agency” where it is “specifically authorized to 
provide assistance to another federal agency, a state, or local governmental entity, when 
its personnel or facilities are especially qualified.”99 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) has its own federal authority for disaster preparedness, emergency operations, 
inspection and rehabilitation of flood risk management projects, advanced measures for 
imminent flooding, drought assistance, and emergency water assistance.100 The 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has authority to respond to public 
health and medical emergencies and disaster situations without a disaster declaration that 
warrant HHS expertise and resources.101 Disaster spending that occurs as part of 
department and agency programs is not counted as part of the DRF. Unless specifically 
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requested, this spending is not reported as part of a comprehensive accounting of all 
federal disaster spending. 
D. FRAGMENTED REPORTING PROCESS 
The federal government lacks a single, annual source documenting disaster 
spending. Notwithstanding that billions are spent each year on disaster response and 
recovery, the fragmented process of reporting on disaster spending endures. This section 
describes specialized spending reports issued by government agencies, as well as specific 
reporting mandates that originate from emergency supplemental spending bills.  
1. Monthly Reports 
The federal government issues a report on a regular basis that provides a piece of 
the federal disaster spending picture. The FEMA disaster relief fund monthly report is a 
comprehensive, congressionally-mandated document including appropriations, 
obligations, and balances of DRF monies.102 This report provides a running tally of the 
DRF balance, a monthly summary of expenditures by catastrophic event, and specific 
expenditures for Hurricane Sandy.103 While the final monthly report in a fiscal year can 
provide an indication of annual DRF spending, the mandate does not include an annual 
summary as a requirement. Consequently, an understanding of stated financial terms of 
appropriation, deobligation, recovery, carryover, transfer, rescission, authority available, 
unobligated balance, unobligated commitments, and reserves are required to interpret the 
outcomes of each report.104 Putting aside the intricate accounting and budgetary terms, 
the DRF monthly report is a valuable data source for the development of an easy to 
understand annual disaster spending report. 
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2. Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, 
and Office of Management and Budget Reports 
Other agencies in the executive branch issue reports on an ad-hoc basis that 
contribute to the understanding of disaster spending. The CRS prepares analytical reports 
on new legislation, changes in policy, or issues relevant to congressional representatives 
for improved policy decision making. The federalism and emergency management 
research section of the CRS develops reports on homeland security, including funding for 
emergency prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The GAO, an 
independent agency headed by the Comptroller General, issues reports to Congress on the 
spending of taxpayer dollars for accountability and performance measures. The OMB, a 
component of the Executive Office of the President, has delivered a number of reports on 
discretionary spending related to sequestration, which is characterized by automatic 
across the board spending cuts for congressional appropriations if spending limits are 
exceeded.105 The OMB issued its first full report on 10-year averages of federal disaster 
spending in January 2012, as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011.106 The Office 
issued a number of other reports related to sequestration, each containing an analysis on 
the discretionary disaster funding ceiling. These reports will continue through 2021.107  
3. Disaster Supplemental Bills 
Emergency supplementals surpassed regular budget allocations to be the primary 
source of federal disaster funding over the 20-year period of this study. In 2014, the CRS 
documented that the September 11, 2001, emergency supplemental spending bill (Pub. L. 
No. 109-234) allocated funding to 19 federal agencies.108 No mechanism exists by which 
these agencies report how they spend this funding. The emergency spending bill for 
Hurricane “Superstorm” Sandy passed by Congress in January 2013 required FEMA to 
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provide a monthly report on spending under the DRF specifically for Sandy.109 In this 
act, Congress mandated FEMA and USACE to submit monthly or quarterly reports, or 
both, on how monies allocated to these agencies were spent.110 Congress also mandated 
quarterly reports to be prepared through September 2015 by the Recovery Accountability 
and Transparency Board on “activities related to funds appropriated for the impact of 
Hurricane Sandy.”111 The Board was created by the 2009 Recovery Act to oversee 
federal funds.112 Aside from these stated requirements, no other mandate exists to report 
federal disaster spending. 
E. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TOWARD AN IMPROVED 
UNDERSTANDING OF FEDERAL DISASTER SPENDING  
Five notable pieces of legislation were introduced from 2006–2015 aimed at 
achieving a better understanding of disaster spending by the federal government. Of the 
five, two were signed into law, the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the Sandy Recovery 
and Improvement Act of 2013. The three bills that were proposed but did not pass include 
the National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act of 2006, 
DISASTER Act, and the FEMA Disaster Assistance Reform Act of 2015.113 
1. Budget Control Act of 2011 
The Budget Control Act of 2011 was noteworthy to the process of disaster 
response budget estimating, as well as to improving the understanding of the range of 
federal agencies receiving disaster funds. The Act put into place limits on discretionary 
spending from FY2012–2021, and provided the OMB with the authority to implement 
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sequestration if necessary.114 Sequestration, or automatic across the board budget cuts, 
would be implemented at the federal level if a plan to reduce the deficit by a specific 
amount were not established. Specific to disaster management, the Act required a 10-year 
calculation by the government of federal disaster appropriations to determine 
discretionary funding ceilings. This new method of calculation is similar to the previous 
budget development process incorporating the past five years of disaster spending; 
however, it is distinct in that the Act mandates the OMB to provide a report on the 
average of the previous 10 years’ annual disaster relief funding, minus the highest and 
lowest years.115  
FEMA and the OMB changed the way in which they jointly formulate budget 
requests to meet the BCA’s mandate. Four factors were formerly used, now only two are, 
consideration of all previous disaster spending, and calculation of a 10-year spending 
average for non-catastrophic (under $500 million) events.116 It is understood that to 
determine this 10-year average of disaster relief funding, each year’s amounts must be 
calculated. The OMB’s methodology includes accounting for annual disaster funds 
allocated to any federal agency, either through the regular budget process or through 
supplemental appropriations. In its initial report mandated by the BCA on disaster 
funding, the OMB performed an exhaustive compilation of funding received from 11 
agencies in 29 different accounts.117 Funding was only considered for major disaster 
declarations under the Stafford Act, or activities specified as directly pursuant to the 
declaration.118 FEMA supports this new approach using a 10-year spending average for 
non-catastrophic events.119 Utilization of this new calculation resulted in larger DRF 
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budget requests in 2013 and 2014, $6.1 and $6.2 billion, respectively.120 It could be 
argued that this new methodology results in a more realistic budget request, as all disaster 
funding is taken into consideration.  
This process is required under the BCA through 2021, and is an excellent source 
to account for annual budgeting for disaster response. This new approach provides a 
comprehensive computation of federal funding allocated to many agencies; however, it 
does not provide detailed information on disaster spending for all funded departments and 
agencies. FEMA’s calculations are based on spending through the DRF, whereas other 
department and agency numbers are based on funding allocated by Congress. These two 
financial aspects are distinct. It may be contended that the annual budget process is a 
function of assessing what a department or agency spent the previous year, and 
determining whether less or more is needed. Regardless, the fact remains no annual 
reporting of federal disaster spending is available through which the government and the 
public can evaluate disaster spending programs and policies. 
2. Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013 
The Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013 is Division B of the 2013 
emergency supplemental appropriation to provide funding for response and recovery to 
Hurricane Sandy that hit the northeastern seaboard in October and November 2012.121 As 
noted throughout this study, the issuance of emergency supplemental bills to fund 
disasters is common; Congress has passed emergency supplementals in 75% of the years 
from FY1995–2014. What was unique in this Act was the mandate for FEMA to develop 
a national strategy detailing how to reduce disaster costs, loss of life, and injuries.122 
Congress noted the report must include recommendations for resiliency measures to 
reduce disaster costs. FEMA submitted its report in September 2013 with 
recommendations for the development of a national strategy. The report is more of a 
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review of things to consider when developing a strategy, versus a strategy itself. It 
describes existing programs in place at FEMA aimed at reducing costs, and describes 
recommendations using the whole community approach toward the themes of 
government capabilities integration, mutual aid, housing, overlap and duplication of 
effort, reducing disaster deaths, and regional and national demographics.123 The report 
also recommended incentivizing preparedness and reducing risk, using data as the basis 
for improving financial disbursement and management, and evaluating disaster 
declaration models.124 Finally, the report says it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of risk and risk management approaches, and identify the primary factors 
impacting increasing disaster costs.125 
Given the 180-day timeframe in which Congress required FEMA to develop a 
national strategy, it is not surprising that the report simply provided areas to consider 
when developing a strategy. However, the intent of the mandate was sound; the country 
must determine an approach it wants to take to reduce disaster costs. A shortcoming of 
the mandate is attempting to solve the problem before understanding what the problem 
actually is. Are ever-increasing amounts being spent on debris removal each year? Are 
under-insured or uninsured individuals being subsidized at ever-increasing rates? Is the 
majority of federal spending going toward coastal disasters? These questions are but a 
few that would need to be answered to understand the picture of disaster spending in this 
country, before solutions can be put into place. 
3. National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement  
Act of 2006 
This bill called for any federal agency using federal funds for any type of disaster 
to report to its department or agency inspector general on the use of those funds.126 The 
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first report would have been required within one year of passage of the appropriation, and 
subsequent reports every six months until all disaster-related funds were expended. 
4. Disclosing Aid Spent To Ensure Relief (DISASTER) Act 
The DISASTER bill was introduced in September 2014, but was not enacted. Yet, 
it is meaningful in what it would have required. The purpose of the bill was, “to require 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to annually submit to Congress a 
report on all disaster-related assistance provided by the Federal Government.”127 
Interestingly, the methodology the OMB implemented as a result of the BCA meets this 
requirement, short of sending an annual report to Congress. The findings of the 
DISASTER Act bill stressed, “The Federal Government does not provide a single, 
publicly available estimate of the amount it is spending on disaster-related assistance.”128 
It referenced a more knowledgeable appropriations process, and only when understanding 
what the government currently spends can areas for cost savings be identified. The bill 
sponsors blogged of the need for accurate disaster budgeting, “As neighbors, friends, and 
fellow Americans, we have a responsibility to ensure that impacted communities get back 
on their feet after a disaster strikes. ...Understanding the full cost of disasters will help 
Congress and the President create budgets that more accurately reflect the needs of our 
communities and help us avoid spending billions of dollars that we hadn’t planned 
on.”129 
5. FEMA Disaster Assistance Reform Act of 2015 
The FEMA Disaster Assistance Reform Act was introduced to provide funding 
and approve certain FEMA programs. A feature of the bill was a mandate for FEMA to 
conduct a disaster cost and loss study via the National Advisory Council, and include 
recommendations to control disaster spending and identify cost savings.130 This mandate 
was noteworthy in that it would have identified trends in both disaster costs and the 
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number of disaster declarations, the factors contributing to these trends, identification of 
cost reduction and mitigation incentives, and potential barriers to implementation of these 
measures. In publicizing the need for this bill, U.S. Representative Lou Barletta 
highlighted the information void when he stated, “It’s been over 20 years since we’ve had 
a comprehensive look at disaster spending.”131 
Each of these proposed and successful legislative efforts demonstrates the lack of, 
and the need for, a more comprehensive way to gauge annual federal disaster spending. 
The absence of a single comprehensive federal disaster spending report is necessary to 
account for and assess the billions spent annually on disaster relief. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: TWENTY YEARS OF DISASTER 
SPENDING 
The federal government spent $130.6 billion on major disaster declarations 
through the DRF over a 20-year period, from FY1995–2014. This study analyzed data 
from FEMA’s disaster financial status report, April 2015 reporting cycle, to develop 
illustrative depictions of disaster spending trends. Spending for 1,156 major declared 
disasters did not exhibit a predictable pattern of annual increases, yet demonstrated an 
overall upward trend. Yearly spending was dependent upon the number of disasters 
declared, and the severity of the damage. It is far from “skyrocketing” or “out of control” 
spending dominating headlines. Escalating federal disaster spending was evident even 
when controlling for inflation, as demonstrated by the rising horizontal trend line shown 
in Figure 1. The upward trend does call into question why government spending 
continued to increase, despite advances in technology, improved warning systems, and 
increased experience with disasters. 
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Figure 1.  Disaster Relief Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 
Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
The federal government spent the most from the DRF in 2005, the year of 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. That year’s $47 billion DRF spending was 
unprecedented, and that level has not been seen before or since. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 
resulted in a supplemental spending bill of $50.5 billion; however, only $11.5 billion of 
that amount was allocated to the DRF.132 The rising disaster spending trend existed even 
when removing the four declarations for Hurricane Katrina, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Disaster Relief Fund Spending, Minus Hurricane Katrina 
Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Over the past 20 years, the federal government averaged $6.5 billion a year in 
spending for disaster relief.133 The range of spending varied, from $652 million in 2000 
to $47 billion in 2005. The average amount spent on any single major declared disaster 
was $112.8 million, as depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Average Disaster Relief Fund Spending per Disaster Event, 
FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015).  
A. COMPARISON OF REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS AND EMERGENCY 
SPENDING BILLS 
Data analysis showed that Congress allocated $45 billion to the DRF through the 
regular budget process, and issued $110 billion in supplemental funding by passing 
emergency spending bills. To provide some perspective, Congress allocated 0.18 
percent—less than one quarter of one percent—of the 2015 federal budget to disaster 
relief.134 Budgeted dollars represented 34% of all DRF major disaster funds spent over 20 
years, and supplemental funding represented 66%, as depicted in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  Percentage of Disaster Relief Fund Spending, by Budgeted and 
Supplemental Appropriations, FY1995–2014 
 
 
Adapted from Bruce R. Lindsay, FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected 
Issues (CRS Report No. R43537) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2014, 8–9). 
Congress passed supplemental spending bills in 15 of the 20 years considered in 
this study. Emergency funding exceeded regularly budgeted disaster funding by a factor 
of 2.4, demonstrating a considerable discrepancy in planned versus actual disaster 
spending, shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Comparison of Disaster Relief Fund Budgeted and Supplemental 
Appropriations, FY1995–2014  
 
Adapted from Bruce R. Lindsay, FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected 
Issues (CRS Report No. R43537) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2014, 8–9). 
The financial gap between budgeted and supplemental disaster funding began to 
shrink with passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011. The Act changed the FEMA 
budget request process, resulting in annual DRF budgeted funding that rose noticeably 
beginning in 2012, as demonstrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Disaster Relief Fund Enacted Appropriations, FY1995–2014  
 
Adapted from Bruce R. Lindsay, FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected 
Issues (CRS Report No. R43537) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2014, 8–9). 
More than three quarters (79%) of DRF funding prior to enactment of the BCA 
was accomplished through emergency supplementals. It is evident the Act resulted in a 
higher percentage of funding allocated under the regular budget process as compared to 




















































Figure 7.  Disaster Relief Fund Allocation, Pre- and Post-budget Control Act, 
FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Bruce R. Lindsay, FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected 
Issues (CRS Report No. R43537) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2014, 8–9). 
B. SPENDING BY DISASTER TYPE 
Often, the issue of federal disaster spending is raised after a large disaster 
requiring billions of federal dollars to help state and local communities recover from 
substantial damage. Taken as a single event, spending levels could seem alarming. 
Reports of improperly dispersed funds or waste, fraud, and abuse of tax dollars after 
disasters are not uncommon. While improper use of funds is a valuable issue for analysis, 
it is beyond the scope of this study. This section explores spending by disaster type, and 
identifies hurricanes, severe storms, and fire as the disaster types with the most federal 
spending. 
Analysis of the data showed that hurricanes were the disaster type that received 
the most federal spending, by a large margin, depicted in Figure 8. Hurricane spending 
represented more than half of all DRF spending over 20 years. 
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Figure 8.  Disaster Relief Fund Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
Some might argue that the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
subsequent unprecedented DRF spending could skew this result. To address this concern, 
this study removed the $41.8 billion in DRF spending specifically coded for Hurricane 
Katrina.135 Analysis revealed the same result; hurricanes are the disaster type that caused 
the most DRF spending, shown in Figure 9.  
                                                 
135 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status Report—April 2015 Reporting 
Cycle. 
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Figure 9.  Disaster Relief Fund Spending by Disaster Type, Minus Hurricane 
Katrina Spending, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
Average spending per hurricane declaration was more than $700 million, as 
illustrated in Figure 10. Fire was the disaster type with the second highest average 
spending per event at just under $300 million, followed by coastal storms just above  
$200 million per disaster. 
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Figure 10.  Average Federal Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
Three disaster types accounted for 89.3% of all DRF spending over the past 20 
years: hurricanes, severe storms, and fire, as presented in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Top Three Disaster Types for Disaster Relief Fund Spending, 
FY1995–2014  
Disaster Type Federal DRF Spending Percent of DRF Spending 
Hurricanes $79.7 billion 61.0% 
Severe Storms $24.9 billion 19.1% 
Fire $12 billion 9.2% 
Totals $127.7 billion 89.3% 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 




The federal government spent 61% of all DRF monies ($79.7 billion) over the 
past 20 years on hurricanes. More than half (58%) of total hurricane spending was in 
FY2005 ($46.9 billion), which had nine hurricane major disaster declarations. Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Sandy accounted for $59 billion in hurricane spending, 
representing close to three quarters of all hurricane spending over the last 20 years (74%). 
One-hundred-seven major disaster declarations for hurricanes were made over 20 years, 
averaging $745 million each. 
In FY2013, 14 hurricane major disaster declarations were made as a result of two 
storms. One declaration was for Hurricane Isaac, and 13 were for Hurricane Sandy. On 
average, spending for each of these declarations was under $1 billion. However, spending 
for each declaration ranged from $3 million to more than $9 billion. Just shy of half of all 
hurricane spending (49%) was under the category of infrastructure. Analysis of hurricane 
spending demonstrated an upward trend, which is depicted by the rising horizontal line in 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Disaster Relief Fund Hurricane Spending, FY1995–2014 
(Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
The five states with the most declarations in 20 years were Florida, Louisiana, 
Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia. Twenty-four states, as well as the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, received hurricane declarations. The 
states that received the highest amount of federal disaster relief for hurricanes included 
Louisiana ($35.3 billion), New York ($10.6 billion), Mississippi ($10.2 billion), Florida 
($6.8 billion), and Texas ($6.5 billion). The states that received the highest amount of 























































declaration), New York (average of $3.5 billion), Mississippi (average of $1.7 billion), 
and New Jersey and Texas (each with an average of $1.1 billion per declaration). 
The share of DRF spending used for hurricanes differed greatly each year; 
however, the trend of percentage of funds used for these types of disasters remained flat, 
as shown in Figure 12. The government on average spent 35% of DRF annually funds on 
hurricanes. 
Figure 12.  Hurricane Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster Relief Fund 
Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
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2. Severe Storms 
The second highest disaster type for federal spending was severe storms at $24.9 
billion, or 19.1% of total DRF spending. Spending for this disaster type demonstrated an 
upward trend, as shown in Figure 13.  
Figure 13.  Disaster Relief Fund Severe Storm Spending, FY1995–2014 
(Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
In this category, 705 major disaster declarations were made over 20 years; yet, no 
specific description outlines what qualifies as a severe storm.136 FEMA uses 27 lettered 
codes to classify a disaster. However, inherent problems exist with this system.137 The 
                                                 
136 Government Accountability Office, Disaster Cost Estimates: FEMA Can Improve Its Learning 
from Past Experience and Management of Disaster-Related Resources (GAO-08-301) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2008), 17. 
137 Ibid. 
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GAO has documented that coding in the DSFR does not always match the description of 
the disaster.138 Other documented problems with the disaster classification system are 
that each disaster can only have one code, and events within the same code had 
conflicting descriptions.139 According to the brief description provided in the DFSR, a 
severe storm event ranged from heavy rainfall to a hurricane to a blizzard. Descriptions in 
the severe storm category encompassed snow and cold events including blizzards, severe 
winter storms, snow, record and near-record snow, snowstorm, extreme snowfall, ice 
jams, heavy snow, ice, freezing rain, freezing temperatures, and snow melt.140 Additional 
severe storm descriptions included heavy rain, excessive rainfall, tropical storms, 
hurricanes, flooding, coastal flooding, wind, straight line winds, high winds, tornadoes, 
landslides, mudslides, debris and mud flow, soil saturation, and mud and rock slides.141 
The government spent $1.2 billion annually on average for severe storms. An 
average of 35 declarations was issued per year in this category, averaging $35 million in 
federal spending per storm. These types of storms were most prevalent in the states of 
Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and New York, which all received at least 
25 severe storm major disaster declarations. However, the states receiving the most in 
federal aid for severe storms were Florida ($2.3 billion), California ($1.7 billion), New 
York ($1.7 billion), Illinois ($1.4 billion), and Missouri ($1.2 billion). All 50 states and 
American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands received a severe storm major disaster declaration and associated federal funding 
in the last 20 years. 
Spending for severe storms demonstrated an upward trend, increasing from $7.3 
billion in the first 10 years to $17.7 billion in the second 10 years. The average amount 
spent annually more than doubled from one decade to the next, from $725 million to $1.8 
billion. On average, DRF spending on severe storms was 21% annually, and ranged from 
                                                 
138 Government Accountability Office, Disaster Cost Estimates: FEMA Can Improve Its Learning 
from Past Experience and Management of Disaster-Related Resources, 17. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Finance Status Report—Obligations Summary 
Report (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015). 
141 Ibid. 
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1%–59%. Severe storm spending as a share of all DRF spending also demonstrated an 
upward trend, depicted in Figure 14.  
Figure 14.  Severe Storm Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster Relief 
Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
3. Fire 
The type of disaster that triggered the third highest amount of federal spending 
over the past 20 years was fire at $12 billion, or 9.2% of DRF spending. Overall spending 
for fire demonstrated a downward trend, as shown in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15.  Disaster Relief Fund Fire Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 
2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Fire declarations were issued in 15 of 20 years, for a total of 41 fire major disaster 
declarations. However, the federal government spent 72.5% ($8.7 billion) of all spending 
for this type of disaster as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The 
government spent the remaining funds on a variety of fires types in 24 states including 
wildland, inland, forest, extreme fire hazards, and wildfire threats.142 Even though some 
events were classified as fire, in 13 of 41 declarations (32%), their descriptions matched 
                                                 
142 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Finance Status Report—Obligations Summary 
Report. 
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other types of events including hurricane, tropical depression, severe storm, flooding, 
landslides, rain, and winds.143 
In all years except 2001 and 2004, less than $300 million was spent in this 
category. The year 2001 is the only year listing “fire and explosion” in this fire type 
category. Of note, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in 
Oklahoma is recorded in the “human cause” type category. Understanding this 
distinction, the average spent annually on natural disaster fire major disaster declarations 
was less than $85 million. Disregarding September 11, 2001, spending in this category, 
the states that received the most federal fire aid from the DRF were Florida, Alabama, 
California, Texas, and Pennsylvania for a total of $2.9 billion. Spending on fires as a 
percentage of total DRF spending demonstrated a decreasing trend over the 20-year 
period, as depicted in Figure 16.  
Figure 16.  Fire Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster Relief Fund 
Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
                                                 
143 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Finance Status Report—Obligations Summary 
Report. 
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The government averaged 6% of total DRF spending on fires annually, with a 
high of 73% in 2001 as a result of the terrorist attacks of that year. In 2004, DRF fire 
spending represented 29% of all DRF spending; yet, the federal government spent the 
majority of that spending for Hurricane Ivan or tropical storm Ivan. 
C. SPENDING BY FIVE DISASTER RELIEF FUND CATEGORIES 
Spending under the DRF is structured into five categories: infrastructure, human 
services, post-disaster mitigation, mission assignments, and FEMA administrative costs. 
Analysis of the $130.6 billion spent through the DRF for FY1995–2014 revealed that the 
government spent the vast majority (74.6%) on infrastructure and human services. 
Federal spending on public infrastructure represented the highest spending category, as 
demonstrated in Table 2.  
Table 2.   Spending Totals in the Five Primary Disaster Relief Fund 
Categories, FY1995–2014 
 
DRF Category 20-Year Total DRF Spending 
Percent of DRF 
Spending 
Infrastructure $65.3 billion 50.0% 
Human Services $32.1 billion 24.6% 
FEMA Administrative Costs $18.0 billion 13.8% 
Post-Disaster Mitigation $8.5 billion 6.5% 
Mission Assignments $6.7 billion 5.1% 
Totals $130.6 billion 100% 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
1. Infrastructure 
The restoration of public infrastructure as a result of a disaster is authorized by the 
Stafford Act, and is codified by a number of policies and regulations in the Code of 
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Federal Regulations.144 Repairing this infrastructure falls under the FEMA public 
assistance (PA) program, which provides federal grants for “debris removal, emergency 
protective measures, and permanent restoration of infrastructure.”145 PA projects are 
determined to be either emergency work, or permanent work. Emergency work is “that 
which must be performed to reduce or eliminate an immediate threat to life, protect 
public health and safety, and to protect improved property that is threatened in a 
significant way as a result of the disaster.”146 Permanent work for infrastructure is 
“required to restore a damaged facility, through repair or restoration, to its pre-disaster 
design, function, and capacity in accordance with applicable codes or standards.”147 PA 
projects are determined by the grantee and approved by FEMA, under the following 
categories: 
• Category A: Debris Removal 
• Category B: Emergency Protective Measures 
• Category C: Roads and Bridges 
• Category D: Water Control Facilities 
• Category E: Public Buildings and Contents 
• Category F: Public Utilities 
• Category G: Parks, Recreational, and Other Facilities148 
The federal government spent $65.3 billion over 20 years on infrastructure, 
equaling half of DRF spending. On average, government infrastructure spending was 
52% annually, ranging from 34–69%. Spending in the infrastructure category 
demonstrated an upward trend, as shown in Figure 17. 
                                                 
144 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public Assistance Policy Digest (Report no. FEMA 321) 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008), 1. 
145 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Fact Sheet: Public Assistance (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 1. 
146 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public Assistance Guide (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2007), 66.  
147 Ibid., 79. 
148 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Fact Sheet: Public Assistance, 1. 
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Figure 17.  Disaster Relief Fund Infrastructure Spending, FY1995–2014 
(Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
 
Infrastructure spending as a percentage of DRF spending also showed an upward 
trend, with a 27% increase from FY1995–2014, as illustrated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  Infrastructure Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster Relief 
Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
In the DSFR, Category A (Debris Removal) and B (Emergency Protective 
Measures) spending are combined when tracking the amount of federal cost share. The 
cost share for infrastructure reflected the 75% federal cost responsibility authorized in the 
Stafford Act, in most cases, 93% of the time. The government provided PA at a different 
level in 69 instances, or 6% of the time. In each case, PA was offered at a federal cost 
share of either 90% or 100%. Hurricanes and severe storms together accounted for more 
than half of these adjusted cost shares. 
The highest single state expenditure by the federal government under the 
infrastructure category was $13.3 billion in 2005 for Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina. 
Second was $7.3 billion for New York for Hurricane Sandy in 2013, and third was  
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$4.7 billion under the disaster type of “fires and explosions” for New York; in other 
words, September 11, 2001. Four states were given major disaster declarations for 
Hurricane Katrina: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The total of all 
infrastructure expenditures by the federal government under the four declarations for 
Hurricane Katrina was $17 billion. 
On average, the federal government spent $3.3 billion in each of the last 20 years 
restoring infrastructure, conducting debris removal, and implementing emergency 
protective measures as a result of a major declared disaster. Research indicated that 
infrastructure spending is primarily expended for hurricanes, as illustrated in Figure 19.  
Figure 19.  Infrastructure Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
2. Human Services 
Section 408 of the Stafford Act authorizes the president to provide what is 
characterized in FEMA reports as human services. These services include assistance to 
individuals in the form of temporary housing, or repair or replacement; and financial 
assistance for housing, medical care, child care, funeral expenses, and transportation.149 
                                                 
149 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), and Related 
Authorities, Section 5174, 5456. 
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Section (h) limits the amount an individual or household can receive at $25,000.150 The 
DFSR also lists inspection services, crisis counseling, and legal services under the human 
services category. Human services accounted for 24.6% of DRF spending, or $32.1 
billion, and demonstrated a slight upward trend, as depicted in Figure 20.  
Figure 20.  Disaster Relief Fund Human Services Spending, FY1995–2014 
(Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
The year with the single largest output in this category was 2005, when the 
federal government spent $15.5 billion on human services. The year 2004 was the only 
other year with more than $2 billion human services spending, at $2.7 billion. The 
average amount spent per year for human services was $1.6 billion. While annual 
                                                 
150 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), and Related 
Authorities, Section 5174 (h), 5458.  
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spending trended up slightly, overall spending in this category as a percentage of DRF 
spending trended down 12%, as illustrated in Figure 21.  
Figure 21.  Human Services Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster Relief 
Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
The human services category of spending consists of the following sub-
categories: individual and family grants, temporary housing, housing resources (mobile 
homes), disaster unemployment assistance, inspection services, crisis counseling, and 
legal services. In 19 out of 20 years, temporary housing was the primary human services 
spending sub-category. In every year, the most spending was for a type of housing 
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assistance. Hurricanes account for more than half of human services spending, as 
illustrated in Figure 22. If these statistics are combined, it can be said that over the past 
20 years, the federal government has spent the most for housing assistance as a result of a 
hurricane or severe storm.  
Figure 22.  Human Services Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
3. FEMA Administrative Costs 
FEMA administrative costs can “include the salary and travel costs for the 
disaster workforce, rent and security expenses associated with field operation locations, 
and supplies and information technology for field operation staff.”151 Annual spending in 
this category demonstrated an upward trend, depicted in Figure 23, and ranged from a 
high of $6.2 billion in 2005 to $66.3 million in 2000. Average annual spending for 
administrative costs was under $1 billion, and in only five of 20 years, or 25% of the 
time, did annual administrative spending surpass that amount. On average, the 
government spent 13% a year for FEMA administrative costs. The year with the highest 
amount spent for this category was 2001, at 27.1%, and the year with the lowest amount 
of spending was 1996 at 6.6%. 
                                                 
151 Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Oversight of 
Administrative Costs for Major Disasters, 8. 
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Figure 23.  Disaster Relief Fund FEMA Administrative Costs Spending, 
FY1995–2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Overall, the percentage of administrative spending continued to rise most years. 
Administrative costs represented 13.8% of DRF spending, for a total of $18 billion. 
Spending in this category demonstrated an upward trend as a percentage of overall DRF 




















































Figure 24.  FEMA Administrative Costs Spending as a Percentage of Total 
Disaster Relief Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
The highest FEMA administrative cost expenditures were for hurricanes (55%), 
fire (19%), and severe storms (18%). FEMA spent more than half of all administrative 
costs for hurricanes, as illustrated in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  FEMA Administrative Costs Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–
2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
4. Mitigation 
Section 404 of the Stafford Act provides the authority to conduct mitigation after 
a disaster event.152 Grants and technical assistance are the two types of mitigation 
assistance available as a result of a major disaster declaration. The federal government 
provides mitigation grants through FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMPG) 
to reduce or eliminate the potential impact of a subsequent disaster. The HMPG “assists 
in implementing long-term hazard mitigation measures following a Presidential major 
disaster declaration,” and is about 15% of the total amount of federal assistance provided 
to a state.153  
The federal government spent $8.5 billion over the past 20 years on mitigation 
assistance after a disaster. An upward trend in mitigation spending was demonstrated, as 
depicted in Figure 26. In most years, less than $800 million was spent annually.  
                                                 
152 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), and Related 
Authorities, Section 406. 
153 “Hazard Mitigation Assistance,” last modified October 15, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-
mitigation-assistance.  
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Figure 26.  Disaster Relief Fund Post-disaster Mitigation Spending, FY1995–
2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Analysis showed that post-disaster mitigation represented 7% of all DRF 
spending, ranging between 1% and 12% for any one year. Mitigation spending 
demonstrated a downward trend as a share of all DRF spending, as depicted in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27.  Post-disaster Mitigation Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster 
Relief Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
Sixty-one percent of mitigation spending over the 20-year period was for severe 
storms, as shown in Figure 28. 
 67 
Figure 28.  Post-disaster Mitigation Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
5. Mission Assignments 
FEMA issues mission assignments to designate activities and reimburse federal 
agencies for work performed in support of declared disasters.154 Mission assignment 
spending demonstrated a slight upward trend over the 20-year period, as shown in  
Figure 29. Federal mission assignment spending accounted for only 5% of all DRF 
spending ($6.7 billion). 
                                                 
154 “2013–2014: Daily Mission Assignment Activity,” accessed February 5, 2016, http://www. 
fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/30824.  
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Figure 29.  Disaster Relief Fund Mission Assignment Spending, FY1995–
2014 (Adjusted to 2014 Dollars) 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015); Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for 
Years 1774 to Estimated 2025 to Convert to Dollars of 2014 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University, 2015). 
Federal government spending for mission assignments surpassed the $1 billion 
mark only once in the years considered in this study, in 2005 ($4.1 billion). Other than 
2005, FEMA spent the most in this category in 2004 ($817.3 million). On average, $336 
million was spent annually on mission assignments. The government spent less than $500 
million annually in 18 of 20 years, or 90% of the time. Mission assignment spending as a 
share of the DRF as a whole demonstrated a downward trend, illustrated in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30.  Mission Assignment Spending as a Percentage of Total Disaster 
Relief Fund Spending, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
Analysis revealed that only 24% of the 1,156 major disaster declarations received 
funding for mission assignments. Of those, four disaster types accounted for 99% of 
mission assignments: hurricanes, severe storms, fire, and floods, as depicted in Figure 31. 
The government spent the most for mission assignments on hurricanes. 
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Figure 31.  Mission Assignment Spending by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
D. MAJOR DISASTER DECLARATIONS 
The number of major disaster declarations ranged from a low of 29 in 1995, to a 
high of 98 in 2011, with an average of 58 annual declarations. Presidents issued major 
disaster declarations at an ever-increasing rate, as illustrated by the rising horizontal trend 
line in Figure 32.  
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Figure 32.  Major Disaster Declarations, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
The type of disaster resulting in the highest number of major disasters declared 
over the last 20 years was severe storms, as shown in Figure 33. In fact, the 705 severe 
storm declarations accounted for more than half of all declarations (61%). More 
declarations for severe storms were made than for all other disaster types combined. 
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Figure 33.  Major Disaster Declarations by Disaster Type, FY1995–2014 
 
Adapted from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Financial Status 
Report—April 2015 Reporting Cycle (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2015). 
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V. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS: SPENDING TRENDS 
Federal disaster funding has been described as skyrocketing spending, runaway 
costs, reckless spending, and spiraling costs.155 Research findings indicate that federal 
disaster spending over the past 20 years demonstrated an upward trend; however, no 
steady increase occurred each year. The data analysis demonstrated the unpredictability 
of disaster damage and resulting spending, but claims of out of control spending were not 
supported. The research question posed for this study was to what extent federal disaster 
spending increased over the last 20 years (FY1995–2014), and what may have 
contributed to that rise? This section describes these rising spending trends, four areas in 
which spending trended down, the most notable spending variances, and the increase in 
the number of major disaster declarations. 
A. FEDERAL SPENDING TRENDED UP 
Analysis of the data presented in Chapter IV resulted in a finding consistent with 
existing literature, that federal disaster spending presented an upward trend over the past 
20 years, even when controlling for inflation. It was not a steady trend, meaning 
escalation in spending did not occur each year. The study found that spending in all five 
DRF categories increased: infrastructure, human services, FEMA administrative costs, 
post-disaster mitigation, and mission assignments. Spending for the disaster type 
occurring most often, severe storms, exhibited a sizeable upward trend. However, 
spending for the most expensive disaster type, hurricanes, remained steady as a 
proportion of DRF spending. In other words, federal government spending increased as a 
result of severe storms, while the ratio of spending for hurricanes did not rise or fall. 
Analysis revealed that the number of major disasters declared by the president 
exhibited an upward trend. Annual quantities varied dramatically, from fewer than 30 
declarations in 1995 to a record 98 major disaster declarations in 2011. Progressively 
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more declarations were requested and issued, which required ever-increasing reliance on 
taxpayer funds for disaster relief.  
Congress issued emergency supplemental spending bills in 15 of the 20 years 
analyzed in this study to provide disaster relief to affected communities. Emergency 
supplemental spending bills represented 66% of major disaster funding over the past 20 
years, leading to the conclusion that Congress financed major disasters primarily through 
emergency supplemental appropriations.  
B. SPENDING IN ALL FIVE DISASTER RELIEF FUND CATEGORIES 
TRENDED UP 
All five of the DRF major spending categories demonstrated trends of increasing 
spending: infrastructure, human services, FEMA administrative costs, post-disaster 
mitigation, and mission assignments. As a percentage of DRF spending, infrastructure, 
FEMA administrative costs, and severe storms demonstrated an increasing trend.  
1. Infrastructure 
This study found that half of all DRF spending was in the category of 
infrastructure. The federal government spent $65.3 billion on infrastructure as a result of 
a declared disaster for activities including debris removal, bridge and road restoration, 
public utility repair, and public building restoration.156 The government averaged $3.3 
billion in annual infrastructure spending. Data analysis revealed an upward spending 
trend in this category, as well as an upward trend in the share of DRF funding used for 
infrastructure. In other words not only did the government spend more to repair disaster-
damaged infrastructure, but increasingly, more of the proportion of all DRF spending was 
for infrastructure. The majority of infrastructure spending was as a result of hurricanes, 
followed by severe storms.  
The scope of this study did not allow for analysis of PA projects awarded by 
FEMA in this category, which address infrastructure restoration. Therefore, the type of 
infrastructure demanding the most spending was not a research focus. Future research on 
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the type of infrastructure, extent of damage in PA categories A-G, and cause of damage 
by disaster type, would contribute to an understanding of factors contributing to rising 
spending for public infrastructure in disasters. 
2. Human Services 
Government spending of $32.1 billion in the human services category represented 
one quarter of DRF spending over the last 20 years. Data analysis showed only a slight 
upward trend in spending. Although close to half of human services spending was in 
FY2005 as a result of Hurricane Katrina, the disaster type resulting in the greatest human 
services spending was hurricanes. The housing assistance subcategory represented the 
largest portion of human services spending. Housing assistance includes temporary 
housing and housing resources, meaning mobile or manufactured homes. Consequently, 
the research found the federal government spent the most in the human services category 
for housing assistance as a result of hurricanes.  
3. FEMA Administrative Costs  
FEMA administrative costs represented 13.8% of DRF spending, or $18 billion, 
and demonstrated a slight upward trend. Average annual spending in this category was 
$899 million. Analysis revealed that FEMA spent more than half of administrative costs 
for hurricanes. The GAO provided recommendations to FEMA to control rising 
administrative spending, but as of December 2014, had not been able to verify 
institutionalization of these controls.157 In 2014, the GAO reported that FEMA’s 
administrative costs doubled from FY1989–2013, and attributed this growth to the 
increase in the number of declared disasters, regardless of disaster size.158 Further, the 
GAO referenced a 2007 FEMA policy change that resulted in an unexpected increase in 
administrative cost reimbursement sought by grantees.159 The study verified that since 
2007, the percentage of administrative spending as a total of the DRF generally 
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increased. More research is needed on administrative costs allocation to determine where 
to focus efforts to reduce overall FEMA administrative costs.  
4. Post-disaster Mitigation 
Federal mitigation spending after a disaster totaled $8.5 billion and demonstrated 
a slight upward trend. This category represented 6.5% of all DRF spending over the 20-
year period. Half of all post-disaster mitigation spending was as a result of hurricanes, 
and one quarter of the spending was for severe storms. Consequently, the government 
spent three quarters of all post-disaster mitigation funds on hurricanes and severe storms.  
5. Mission Assignments 
Spending for mission assignments totaled $6.7 billion, and demonstrated a slight 
upward trend. More than half of all mission assignment spending was in one year, 2005, 
as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricanes were by far the most common disaster type 
for mission assignment spending, accounting for 82% of all spending in this category. 
This category represented 5.1% of all DRF spending. 
C. FOUR AREAS TRENDED DOWN AS A PROPORTION OF DISASTER 
RELIEF FUND SPENDING  
Although all five major categories of the DRF demonstrated trends of increasing 
spending, four areas of analysis demonstrated downward spending as a proportion of 
DRF spending, including the following: fire, human services, post-disaster mitigation, 
and mission assignments. In other words, the fraction of the DRF spent for each of those 
disaster types and services decreased. This section describes the demonstrated falling 
trend in these four areas. 
1. Fire 
This study found that DRF fire spending demonstrated a downward trend over the 
past 20 years, both in dollars spent, and as a percentage of overall DRF spending. One 
potential explanation for the downward trend may be due to federal funding sources for 
fire suppression. The budget of the U.S. Forest Service funds wildland fire 
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suppression.160 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) also funds firefighting on BLM 
lands out of their annual agency budget. The Stafford Act specifically names fire as a 
type of disaster eligible for federal funds.161 However, national policy dictates that 
spending for fire disasters be performed through the Forest Service and BLM annual 
budgets. The proportion of the Forest Service’s budget directed toward these activities 
rose 34% over the past 20 years, resulting in internal agency financial maneuvers to 
transfer funds and staff from non-fire programs to cover increasing costs of 
firefighting.162 The Secretary of the Department of Agriculture who oversees the Forest 
Service has said, “the Forest Service is expected to absorb those costs into its regular 
budget, which remains relatively flat” and “This means that every year, fire grows as a 
percentage of the agency’s budget, while all other programs shrink.”163 
Only 41 fire major disasters were declared over 20 years, and two of those were 
as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. DRF spending for those “fires 
and explosions” accounted for 72% of all DRF fire spending. While analysis of DRF fire 
spending trended down, this finding does not accurately reflect federal efforts and 
spending on firefighting. This downward trend must be combined with agency annual 
budgets and expenditures to determine realistic fire spending trends by the federal 
government. 
2. Human Services 
While spending in human services trended up slightly, the percentage of spending 
in this category demonstrated a downward trend. As demonstrated earlier in this study, 
the costliest sub-category of human services in every single year from FY1995–2014 was 
temporary housing. Combining this finding with the second costliest sub-category of 
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housing resources, mobile homes, suggests that the vast majority of human services 
spending (79%) were for housing assistance. Understanding that the disasters that most 
often require these types of services are hurricanes and severe storms, it can be concluded 
that either existing insurance policies are not adequate for these types of disaster 
scenarios, or homeowners and renters choose not to opt into this type of insurance. 
FEMA has been referred to as the insurer of last resort.164 As such, the government 
should consider new methods to ensure that insurance is adequate, or that people 
understand exactly what their insurance policy covers.  
3. Post-disaster Mitigation 
Post-disaster mitigation spending demonstrated a downward trend as a percentage 
of overall DRF spending. Federal funds are provided for mitigation after a disaster to 
reduce the risk for future disaster impacts. Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes a 
maximum of 15% for mitigation efforts to “substantially reduce the risk of future 
damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area affected by a major disaster.”165 The 
study found that post-disaster mitigation spending represented only 6.5% of all DRF 
spending over the 20-year period. The majority of federal disaster spending under the 
DRF is for response and recovery, despite evidence that substantial investment in 
mitigation can reduce future disaster costs. It has been documented that every dollar spent 
on mitigation saves four dollars in response and recovery.166 Post-disaster mitigation 
grants are one source of mitigation funding by the federal government. FEMA issues pre-
disaster mitigation grants as authorized in Section 203 of the Stafford Act for risk 
reduction.167 The purpose is to lower potential damages resulting from future disaster 
events; thereby, lowering reliance on federal disaster funds. FEMA also issues flood 
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mitigation assistance grants as authorized by the 1994 National Flood Insurance Reform 
Act. For FY2015, pre-disaster mitigation grant funding totaled $300 million, and flood 
mitigation grants totaled $150 million.168 
Investment in mitigation is often cited as necessary to address rising federal 
disaster costs and spending.169 FEMA’s director under President Clinton emphasized 
mitigation through the 1990s, and was often credited with strengthening relationships 
with Congress, as well as the state governments it served.170 The current disaster funding 
system gives prominence to response and recovery. Without a drastic change in the 
nation’s approach to risk management to emphasize investment in mitigation, it is 
unlikely that the upward trend in federal disaster spending will change. Emily Lehr 
Wallace of the American Geological Institute emphasized the importance of reducing the 
impact of natural hazards and underscored that it should be a government priority.171 
Lehr Wallace acknowledged the difficulty of governments prioritizing hazard mitigation 
due to “Public amnesia about disasters, including the ‘it won’t happen to me’ 
syndrome.”172 
4. Mission Assignments 
Government spending for mission assignments as a proportion of overall DRF 
spending demonstrated a decreasing trend over the 20-year period. Hurricanes, followed 
by severe storms, represented the disaster types with the most spending in this category. 
Only 278 of the 1,156 major disaster declarations analyzed for this study (24%) received 
spending in this category. One explanation for the lack of mission assignments for a 
higher number of declared disasters could be that much of the direct federal assistance 
                                                 
168 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program Fact Sheet 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 1; Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, FY 2015 Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 1. 
169 Weiss and Weidman, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-Relief, 5; Gregory W. Eaton, 
“Improving Risk Management and Resiliency: A Plan for a Proactive National Policy on Insurance 
Practices in FEMA’s Public Assistance Program” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), xxiii. 
170 Derthick, “Where Federalism Didn’t Fail,” 37. 
171 Wallace and Millar, “Beating Natural Hazards to the Punch.”  
172 Ibid. 
 80 
falls under the category of infrastructure or human services, and separate mission 
assignments were not required. Additional research is needed to itemize the types of 
missions that were assigned, to which agencies they were assigned, and for which types 
of disasters to identify areas to focus for reducing spending. 
D. THE NUMBER OF DECLARED DISASTERS TRENDED UP 
The study found that the number of annual major disaster declarations 
demonstrated an upward trend. On average, 58 declarations were made each year, with a 
low of 29 and a high of 98. Major disaster declarations are provided to a state or tribal 
government, upon request from the governor or tribal official. An increase in declarations 
could mean more states are affected by a disaster, since a single declaration per incident 
was not made, but one was made for each impacted state or tribe. Additionally, perhaps 
more states are able to qualify for federal funds under the per capita threshold, or an 
increasing number of states are familiar with the declaration process, and are able to 
navigate a request for declaration successfully. The GAO offered a number of state-level 
factors that may have had an impact on the increasing trend of declaration of major 
disasters:  
In addition to the federal elements that may have played a role in the 
increases, there are a number of state-level factors that have made the 
states more likely to request a declaration than in years past. These may be 
the result of various factors including 1) budget shortfalls, 2) a “learning 
curve” in declarations, and 3) the professionalization of emergency 
management.173 
Severe storms accounted for 61% of all major disaster declarations. FEMA’s 
characterization of the 705 severe storm declarations listed in the DFSR itemized a wide 
variety of damage cause and impact, including the following: blizzards, freezing rain, 
tropical storms, hurricanes, excessive rainfall, straight line winds, tornadoes, high winds, 
coastal flooding, soil saturation, and mud flow.174 Despite the high number of severe 
storm declarations over the past 20 years, the GAO has verified the lack of a specific 
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definition of what qualifies as a severe storm.175 Criteria for this type of disaster in 
needed to better illustrate the types of disasters affecting the United States, and to inform 
policymakers and taxpayers better as to where federal funding for disasters is being spent. 
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VI. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS: FACTORS 
CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED SPENDING 
This study’s analysis of 1,156 major disaster declarations determined that overall, 
federal disaster spending demonstrated an upward trend. When the greatest year of DRF 
spending, FY2005, was eliminated from the analysis, the disaster spending trend 
remained on the rise. This removal indicates that spending for Hurricane Katrina, the 
disaster resulting in the most DRF allocation over the past 20 years, is not solely 
responsible for the upward spending. This section explores potential explanations for the 
trend of increasing disaster spending based on frequently cited factors in the literature, 
including the following: the expansion of federal involvement in disasters, the increase in 
quantity of major declared disasters, a low per capita damage indicator, and government 
subsidy of private property insurance. This section also expounds upon influences 
identified in the study analysis, including the following: underfunding of disasters, 
inadequate tracking of disaster spending, and disincentives to changing the spending 
practice status quo. 
A. GOVERNMENT ROLES IN LIGHT OF EXPANDING FEDERAL SCOPE 
The breadth of what the federal government pays for in disasters, and the 
government’s role, has expanded since implementation of the Stafford Act.176 In 1998, 
the GAO reported, “more facilities have become eligible for disaster assistance. Over the 
years, the Congress has generally increased eligibility through legislation that expanded 
the categories of assistance and/or specified persons or organizations eligible to receive 
assistance.”177 More than 20 years later, the CRS highlighted expanding coverage under 
the Stafford Act, stating, “The scope of the statute has expanded considerably over the 
decades to provide a wide range of grants for the needs of individuals, families, certain 
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community organizations, and state and local government operations.”178 The growing 
federal reach in disasters leads to uncertainty about fiscal sustainability. The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies questioned the feasibility of this expanded federal role 
in light of the national debt, and advocated for funding reform initiated by Congress.179 
Moss et al. emphasize an expanded state and local level role in the management 
of disasters in discussion of the federalism concept. In a report on proposed Stafford Act 
revisions, the authors stressed that the Act’s intent was to supplement state and local 
governments in disasters, which is where the primary responsibility should lie.180 One 
example of this expansion is the revision of FEMA’s snow assistance policy. To align 
with language in the Stafford Act better, policy was changed in 2009 to consider 
snowstorms eligible for major disaster declarations.181 The policy change resulted in 16 
snow events in one year that were considered major disasters, as opposed to emergencies, 
which were eligible to receive unlimited federal disaster funding.182 The policy change 
leading to the expansion of services lends itself to a succinct summary of the debate over 
state and federal roles in a disaster: 
At the heart of the declaration phenomenon is the role of the government 
when a disaster strikes. While it is generally agreed that the government 
should help disaster victims in time of need, it is unclear whether the fiscal 
responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state 
government.183 
Roles of different levels of government are embodied in the concept of federalism. 
Intrinsic checks and balances in the structure of state and local governments existing in 
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parallel with a federal government characterize a federalist system.184 The federalist 
perspective, then, contends that the very structure of the U.S. government should prohibit 
federal participation in all but the truly national disasters. This view does not define what 
a national disaster is, but emphasizes the 10th Amendment to the Constitution as 
justification. This amendment stipulates that individual state governments operate 
concurrently with a federal government, and the federal government has only the powers 
specified in the Constitution. The 10th Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”185 Therefore, the federalist view argues, a disaster 
should be managed at the state level, without interference by the federal government. 
This perspective argues that federal tax dollars should not be spent on disasters, as states 
can and should be able to manage most disasters on their own.  
An amplified federalist viewpoint asserts that federal disaster assistance in any 
form should not exist. This notion is that simply the existence of a federal disaster 
funding backstop, in the form of the Stafford Act, has the following consequences: it 
prohibits state and local investment in disaster preparedness and mitigation, it reduces or 
eliminates incentives for states to be prepared for a disaster, and it acts as state 
entitlement.186 The entitlement argument is strengthened when it is recognized that no 
prerequisite state-level investments are in place to reduce the need for a federal disaster 
spending safety net.187 The law stipulates the federal government will pay for 75% of 
certain costs of a disaster, and the state must contribute 25% to the share of that 
funding.188 This one quarter cost share is often divided among the state and its affected 
counties or localities. Federal aid is thought to deter better preparedness, because a 
fallback is always available, and the financial cost to state and local governments is 
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relatively low.189 It has been said the existence of the Stafford Act creates an incentive 
for a state to wait for a disaster to occur, then accept federal funding to restore and 
rebuild.190 Chris Edwards of the CATO Institute strongly recommends eliminating 
FEMA altogether, arguing that the agency’s only role is transferring money from the 
federal government to the states.191 His argument supports the idea that the United States 
should have a decentralized approach to disasters; in other words, a narrow federal 
government role in disasters, with states taking on more of this responsibility.  
FEMA recently proposed a new funding approach requiring state-level investment 
as a precursor to the receipt of public assistance funds under a major disaster 
declaration.192 This proposal could indicate that FEMA may be attempting to move 
toward a federalist perspective. The agency has said, “the current FEMA process of 
funding all eligible costs once a disaster declaration has been made ‘is somewhat at odds’ 
with the Stafford Act’s principle that local governments can handle a certain amount of 
the burden on their own.”193 
The roles, responsibilities, and limitations of the states and the federal 
government, which exist as distinct yet symbiotic levels of government, are central to the 
concept of federalism. The existence of the Stafford Act and its legal baseline 
establishing the federal government as responsible for three quarters of all major disaster 
costs presents a challenge to elected officials and the nation. To what extent should the 
federal government use taxpayer money to pay for disasters?  
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B. MORE DISASTERS ARE BEING DECLARED 
The increased number of major disaster declarations is often cited as contributing 
to increasing disaster costs.194 A reduction in the overall number of declarations is 
recommended as the method to reduce federal disaster spending.195 It must be 
contemplated whether simply having more disasters is the cause of increased spending. 
Many reports and articles note an astonishing statistic of the increase in the number of 
major disaster declarations since 1953, when the issuance of declarations began. These 
statistics can be alarming:  
• 1960s: $3.7 billion 
• 1970s: $9.5 billion 
• 1980s: $7.3 billion 
• 1990s: $34.8 billion 
• 2000s: $92.9 billion196 
These numbers demonstrate an increase in spending in all decades since disaster 
declarations came into being, except the 1980s. It is generally accepted that the reason the 
costs to the government in the 1980s were so comparatively low is the lack of large 
disasters in that timeframe. Much of the description of cost or spending increases over the 
past 60 years has been by decade, as listed earlier in this section. Other descriptions are 
quite specific, such as focusing on a few selected years or the most recent high-dollar 
disaster.197 The CATO Institute emphasized the decade approach, averaged for the 10-
year period: “Annual average FEMA spending was $0.7 billion in the 1980s, $2.8 billion 
in the 1990s, $13 billion in the 2000s, and $13 billion so far in the 2010s.”198  
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In 2015, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) characterized the federal debt as this 
nation’s number one threat: “[we] have amassed a national debt that poses the most 
significant threat to our freedom and security as a nation.”199 He criticized homeland 
security spending as lacking in demonstrated value, although he did not provide 
suggestions with regard to how to measure or establish value. Former House of 
Representatives member Charlie Stenholm testified to Congress in 2005 that high levels 
of spending and resulting deficits are a critical aspect of economic security for the United 
States.200 Notably, Senator Coburn criticized the disaster declaration process as the 
source of the spending problem, and added that many declared disasters should not be 
considered disasters at all.201 Reducing the number of declared disasters, therefore, 
would reduce federal disaster spending.  
A commonly cited 2013 report from the Center for American Progress faults 
climate change for extreme weather events, which have cost the federal government $136 
billion from FY2011–2013.202 Based on the reports, a graph with a steadily increasing 
line of major disaster declarations might be expected. Yet, as this study’s analysis 
demonstrated in Chapter IV, the data is more haphazard, reflecting the unpredictability of 
disasters. The CRS described implementing standardized criteria to curb the number of 
declared “marginal” disasters that receive federal funding.203  
The number of major declarations in a given year does not automatically 
determine the highest levels of spending. Simply put, the number of major declarations 
does not cause high federal spending levels. For example, in 2005, the year of Hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, 45 major disasters declared resulted in DRF spending of $46.9 
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billion.204 In 2011, 98 major declared disasters cost the federal government $7 billion.205 
While declaration numbers and spending are correlated, causation is not proven. The 
number of disasters declared does not result in higher spending, but the amount of 
damage incurred determines spending levels. 
A 2015 CRS report offered a number of possible dynamics that may have 
influenced the rising number of disaster declarations, including the following: more 
severe storms, better technology to predict weather patterns, more people living where 
incidents occur, a higher standard of living, regulatory or policy changes, and improved 
awareness of the declaration process.206 This report also cited emergency declarations as 
a potential factor in rising declaration numbers. These declarations, which are issued in 
advance of an imminent disaster, and are capped at $5 million, were not part of this 
study.207 Additionally, the CRS report cited possible state-level factors that may have 
influenced the increase in declarations, including tightened state budgets, and “the 
professionalization of emergency management.”208 
C. LOW PER CAPITA DAMAGE INDICATOR VERSUS TOTAL TAXABLE 
RESOURCES 
In the 1988 Stafford Act, Congress stipulated that an “arithmetic formula or 
sliding scale based on income or population” cannot be used to determine state disaster 
declaration eligibility.209 However, the amount of damage impacting a jurisdiction has 
implications for a governor’s decision-making process with respect to requesting a major 
disaster declaration. A dollar amount based on the number of individuals in a designated 
damage area is one of the tools used to determine damage impact. These per capita 
damage indicators are determined annually and are used as a threshold to measure both 
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county-level and state-level damages. Although not the only component, the GAO 
determined that the state per capita damage indicator is the primary instrument FEMA 
uses to determine eligibility for a major declaration.210 The indicator has the greatest 
influence in a major disaster declaration request, as it is the primary consideration in 
determining declaration eligibility.211 As of October 2014, the per capita indicator a state 
must meet for a major declaration request to be considered was $1.41.212  
Of the two sides of this debate, the idea that the state damage indictor is too low is 
dominant. Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma offered an amendment in 2012, which was 
not passed, to revise the indicator arguing that it was biased in favor of less populated 
states.213 He claimed the result of the low indicator was “disasters often being declared 
after routine weather events.”214 The view that an increasing number of “routine” 
disasters have become federalized was, and continues to be, central to the movement to 
raise the indicator. Changing this criterion would result in a sizeable reduction in 
spending.215 
The GAO has stated the declaration process does not consider a state’s ability to 
respond without federal assistance, and emphasized that the indicator is too low.216 
FEMA has highlighted construction, as well as other costs that have risen at a higher rate 
than the indicator.217 Such statements demonstrate an inherent understanding and federal 
documentation that the damage threshold is too low, meaning more disasters qualify for 
major declarations than perhaps should. The CRS has noted that FEMA has made 
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attempts to change the per capita damage threshold in the past, more than annual inflation 
adjustments, but Congress has denied these efforts.218 
The GAO has recommended increasing the indicator amount over many years to 
account for the rise in associated costs and income levels, instead of a lump sum increase 
that could impact states’ response capabilities.219 The GAO and the DHS’s Office of 
Inspector General have stated that if the per capita damage indicator had been adjusted to 
account for both inflation and other economic conditions starting from the first year the 
indicator was used, the result would have eliminated a large number of disasters from 
meeting criteria for a major declaration.220 If per capita changes had been put into effect, 
the GAO analysis reported that 44% of the 508 major declarations eligible for PA from 
FY2004–2011 would not have met the major disaster threshold.221 A monetary amount 
was not provided in the report to demonstrate the cost savings to the federal government. 
This study’s research reproduced the GAO methodology to analyze the 508 declarations, 
and found that 224 declarations would not have been eligible for federal assistance. This 
study selected the lowest spending totals for the 224 declarations, without knowing which 
of the more than 500 declarations would not have qualified. The resulting finding was 
that at a minimum, $1.4 billion of federal taxpayer money would have been saved. While 
a substantial savings, actual savings could have been much higher. 
In January 2016, FEMA proposed a “disaster deductible” as an alternative to 
raising the per capita threshold.222 The intent was for states (or other similar level 
grantees, such as tribal governments or U.S. territories), to demonstrate intent and 
capability to contribute financial resources through investment in their own preparedness 
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prior to receiving federal aid for public assistance. It is not simply a straight dollar match. 
The proposed approach incentivizes state investment by offering credits to states that 
make certain investments, ostensibly reducing their future federal disaster assistance 
need. FEMA’s perspective as stated in the Federal Register notice is, “The deductible 
model would increase stakeholder investment and participation in disaster recovery and 
building for future risk, thereby strengthening our nation’s resilience to disaster events 
and reducing the cost of disasters long term.”223 Responsible and effective management 
of taxpayer dollars is cited throughout the notice as an intended outcome of the proposed 
approach.224 Emergency Management magazine online noted, “The overall goal is to 
reduce the burden on taxpayers through mitigation incentives and risk-informed decisions 
that promote resilience.”225 Support for the proposal highlights tackling of the moral 
hazard, and putting into place the proper incentives for states.226 It is not the first attempt 
to institute a disaster deductible. Congress rebuffed FEMA’s 1986 proposed change, and 
in turn, instituted the “no arithmetic formula” for disaster declarations to keep options 
available for public officials.227 FEMA Administrator W. Craig Fugate expressed concern 
with relying solely on increasing the per capita threshold as a solution to the rising 
number of major declarations issued; claiming that for larger states, the threshold would 
be so high, it would be difficult to meet.228  
Criticism of the way in which the per capita indicator currently works is that it 
only includes what the name implies, income per person. It does not include business or 
other taxable income that contributes to a state’s capability to respond to a disaster.229 
Hence, the indicator is seen to be artificially low, and more disasters receive federal 
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declarations than perhaps should. Based on input from states, FEMA has suggested 
increasing the indicator over time, to prevent a sudden jump in funds needed by a state to 
qualify for a declaration.230 The GAO advocates for an altogether different approach 
called total taxable resources:  
Total Taxable Resources (TTR), a measure developed by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, provides a more comprehensive measure of a 
jurisdiction’s fiscal capacity than FEMA’s current PA indicator. For 
example, TTR includes much of the business income that does not become 
part of the income flow to jurisdiction residents, undistributed corporate 
profits, and rents and interest payments made by businesses to out-of-
jurisdiction real estate owners and lenders. In the case of FEMA’s PA 
program, adjustments for TTR in setting the threshold for a disaster 
declaration could result in a more realistic estimate of a jurisdiction’s 
ability to respond to a disaster.231 
Using the TRR method would expand the consideration of what to include when 
determining a state’s capability to respond to a disaster or seek federal assistance. This 
approach would endorse a formula-based determination of eligibility prohibited by 
Congress. Yet, similar to how the per capita indicator is currently used, the TTR 
methodology could be established as one of many factors in determining eligibility.  
D. SHIFTING PROPERTY INSURANCE MORAL HAZARD TO THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Insurance for homeowners, renters, and businesses in hazard areas is either 
unavailable, or not reflective of current market conditions.232 In other words, 
homeowners may not carry any insurance, or they may underinsure their properties.233 
As of the 2010 U.S. census, 49.9 million housing units were located in coastal shoreline 
counties, yet only between 100,000–260,000 homeowners in coastal areas have private 
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sector insurance policies.234 This number represents a considerable insurance gap. The 
desire to live near a coast combined with limited supply results in increasing coastal 
property values. This increase in property values is one factor in the increasing cost, and 
resulting federal spending, for storms impacting coastal areas.235 The National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) national coastal population trends report 
established, “Regardless of how the coast is defined, it is substantially more crowded 
than the U.S. as a whole, and population density in coastal areas will continue to increase 
in the future.”236 The report documented a stunning four-decade increase, close to 35 
million more people inhabited coastal communities in 2010 than in 1970.237 NOAA 
further documented that 39% of the entire U.S. population lives in coastal counties.238 
The rise in coastal population and lack of insurance indicates the potential for high future 
disaster spending.  
The lack of available private sector flood insurance inevitably leads to examining 
public sector insurance options. It has been reported that the private sector insurance 
industry may rely more on the government in the future for disaster-related risk 
management, while the government “is increasingly a reluctant partner.”239 This 
hesitancy could be reflective of the government’s experience in managing the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Created in 1968, the NFIP aims to “reduce the impact 
of flooding on private and public structures...by providing affordable insurance to 
property owners and by encouraging communities to adopt and enforce floodplain 
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management regulations.”240 Although the program was intended to increase responsible 
land development, it actually incentivized the opposite, and has been attributed to the 
government subsidizing flood insurance.241 
The insolvency of the NFIP is well documented. The program was between $16–
20 billion in debt as a result of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.242 The NFIP sank to $24 
billion in debt, potentially reaching $30 billion, as a result of Hurricane Sandy in the fall 
of 2012.243 Three months prior to Sandy’s impact, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.244 This act addressed a common criticism of 
federal flood insurance, namely, that it did not reflect true market prices, and was in 
essence, a subsidy to homeowners living in hazard areas.245 Resulting rate hikes and 
increased premiums were not well received.246 As a result, major provisions of Biggert-
Waters were repealed in 2014 with the passage of the Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act.247 Many saw this repeal as a mistake, with the government in effect re-
assuming the cost of the moral hazard of individual risk-taking at the expense of all 
taxpayers. Dr. Alan Eastman, professor of finance and legal studies at the Indiana 
University of Pennsylvania, advocated reestablishing Biggert-Waters, “to get premiums 
to reflect the true cost of the flood risk...in flood prone areas. This is required...for 
financial viability, but also to eliminate the increased demand for property development 
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caused by below market pricing of risk.”248 This viewpoint summarizes the moral hazard 
that the generosity of federally provided, low-cost flood insurance incentivizes risky 
behavior paid for by taxpayers.249 It means the availability of under market-value 
insurance promotes land use and habitation in high-risk areas, without the risk-takers 
absorbing the various costs of that behavior. Citizens, communities, the government, and 
taxpayers are shielded from the real risk. 
In contrast to repeals in the Insurance Affordability Act, the American Security 
Project emphasized the need for more insurance coverage, particularly in highly 
populated U.S. coastal areas.250 It cites the tripling of natural disaster costs since the 
early 1970s, and notes that existing disaster insurance policy “incentivizes poor risk 
management.”251 The use of insurance as a motivator and reward for prescribed behavior 
disperses costs can promote mitigation, and makes reliance on taxpayer-funded disaster 
relief less likely.252 The DHS’s Office of Inspector General 2011 report concluded that, 
“FEMA’s PA program creates a disincentive to carry insurance.”253 A requirement for 
homeowners to obtain insurance at the appropriate level to cover losses would reduce 
federal taxpayer subsidy of individuals taking on more risk than they can handle. 
This perspective of individuals managing risk through insurance at non-
subsidized, market-based cost is contrasted with the economic realities of such a change 
in national policy. As was demonstrated by enactment of Biggert-Waters, and its 
subsequent repeal two years later, the financial cost to consumers—and political cost to 
policymakers—of true risk management was too high to bear. Steve Ellis with Taxpayers 
for Common Sense summed up the divergent perspectives in his rebuke of the repeal, 
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“While politically expedient today, this abdication of responsibility by Congress is going 
to come back and bite them and taxpayers when the next disaster strikes.”254 
In addition to the cost of increasing insurance premiums to homeowners, 
community economics influence this issue. Land development decisions are under the 
purview of local ordinances. Municipal and state governments may be more inclined to 
allow the development of property in a hazard area to increase the tax base, and to 
provide housing, business opportunities, and entertainment venues to attract and sustain a 
viable economy.255 Legal reforms necessary to ensure continuity of the government flood 
insurance program are at odds with local, economic-based decisions that may be essential 
for community sustainability and vitality. The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies supported a risk management approach and advocated for a national dialogue 
with regard to development within hazard areas.256 
E. UNDERFUNDING DISASTERS 
Over the past 20 years, Congress budgeted only 34% of major disaster spending, 
for a total of $45 billion. This amount indicates that more, not fewer, budgeted dollars for 
disaster relief are needed to meet needs based on existing nation disaster policy. The 
inability to budget appropriately for disasters reflects either a misinterpretation of 
historical evidence detailing how much disasters actually cost the taxpayer, or a 
purposeful decision to manage disaster funding as emergency (non-budgetary) spending. 
Annual DRF budgeted dollars ranged from $222 million to $7 billion. In a 12-year period 
from FY2000–2011, DRF budget requests averaged $2 billion, yet average annual 
spending was $4.2 billion.257 This funding shortfall suggests that while it is not possible 
to predict which years may have higher disaster impacts, it must be acknowledged that 
estimating disaster funding needs over the last 20 years has been done poorly.  
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Annual differences in disaster spending underscore the difficulties of disaster 
budgeting. Yearly predictions of the type and frequency of disasters are inexact at best 
and a guessing game at worst. Therefore, how much the federal government will need for 
disaster spending to cover all its disaster relief requirements on an annual basis cannot be 
known. This notion is one of the intended benefits of providing federal funding for 
disasters through the DRF, which is a “no-year” fund.258 Therefore, unused monies can 
roll over to the next fiscal year. If the DRF does not have enough funds to cover the costs 
of a disaster, Congress can pass an emergency supplemental spending bill. Rollover funds 
are taken into account when the OMB and FEMA develop the agency’s annual budget 
request. One facet of this budgeting issue is that the government does not include the 
potential for catastrophic disasters in its annual budget development.259 In financial 
terms, catastrophic disasters are characterized as those where federal spending would be 
more than $500 million.260 These large-scale disasters are funded by emergency 
supplemental spending bills passed by Congress, in addition to any funds remaining in 
the DRF. Analysis found that the United States averages more than one of these 
catastrophic disasters each year; yet, the government does not budget for them.  
A disincentive exists for more accurate budgeting when Congress has the ability 
to issue emergency supplemental spending bills with few, if any, restrictions. By 
necessity, these bills are proposed outside of the budget cycle. Congressed passed 
emergency supplementals in 15 of 20 years analyzed for this study, for a total of $110 
billion. Findings show that emergency supplementals surpassed budgeted funds as the 
primary source of federal disaster funding, accounting for 66% of all DRF spending. It 
has been argued that Congress has no incentive to change its reliance on emergency 
funding for disasters, because it enables representatives to look gracious and benevolent 
without having to carve billions out of the budget each year. Supplemental spending bills 
do not count against the annual budget. The purpose of Congress as a legislative body is 
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to write legislation; disaster funding legislation is one type that is not difficult to pass in 
times of crisis. 
Senators and congressional representatives have long criticized the issuance of 
disaster aid supplemental bills, often under the guise that these laws will contribute to the 
deficit and increase the national debt. Longtime South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham 
requested federal disaster aid for damage caused by 2015 floods in his state, after denying 
aid to New Jersey and other northern states as a result of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. 
Graham claimed he voted against Sandy aid because the legislation contained too much 
non-disaster related funding. The process of issuing supplemental disaster funding bills 
has been criticized as a source of pork. Surprisingly, these bills are not exclusive to 
disaster relief, nor are they exclusive to one specific disaster, which was the original 
driver for additional funding. Congress not only provided supplemental funding in the 
majority of the years analyzed for this study, but the supplementals totaled more than the 
entire annual DRF funding for that year close to 90% of the time. In other words, in the 
vast majority of cases, annual budgeted DRF funding was vastly unrealistic and 
insufficient. 
The Budget Control Act of 2011 transformed the way in which FEMA annual 
budget requests are developed, which resulted in increases in DRF budgeted allocations 
beginning in FY2012. This approach more accurately reflects historical data, which 
demonstrates the need for more annual funding. Yet, in the three years that this revised 
budgeting approach has been in place, emergency supplemental appropriations surpassed 
the total budgeted DRF funds, which was the case even though supplementals were 
issued in only two of the three years. The impact of Hurricane Sandy on the northern east 
coast in the fall of 2012 resulted in DRF supplemental funding that was the second 
highest disaster supplemental in 20 years, after Hurricane Katrina.  
F. INADEQUATE TRACKING OF DISASTER SPENDING 
Chapter III established the lack of an annual accounting of all federal funds spent 
on disaster response and recovery. A 2013 report by the Center for American Progress 
noted, “public officials lack complete knowledge about annual federal spending on 
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disaster relief and recovery”261 Former FEMA Administrator R. David Paulison, the 
Director of the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of 
Colorado in Boulder, and the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group at the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research, all criticized a lack of comprehensive accounting of 
disaster costs, which inhibits proper public debate and characterization of the challenge 
of rising federal disaster spending.262 The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
stressed, “In a fiscally strained environment, finding ways to better prepare for and 
recover from disasters in a manner that is cost-efficient is all the more important.”263 
Their recommendation was to “increase collection, analysis, and distribution of disaster-
related data and information to inform development of preparedness and resilience 
policies.”264 The Center for American Progress recommended, “President Obama should 
require the Office of Management and Budget to conduct an annual—and complete—
accounting of funds spent on every disaster-relief and recovery program in the previous 
fiscal year.”265 
This study focused on analysis of the DRF, as it is the account by which Congress 
annually allocates funds for disaster relief. FEMA provides a monthly report to Congress 
on the balance of the DRF, but it contains many specific accounting terms that may not 
be easy for the public to interpret.266 Other federal disaster funding sources could 
contribute to a more accurate annual picture of federal disaster spending. These sources 
include individual department and agency disaster spending from their own budgets, and 
emergency disaster supplemental spending bills that allocate funds to the Department of 
Defense, individual federal departments and agencies, and non-profit organizations. 
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A 2014 CRS report emphasized that funding provided through supplementals is 
allocated to many agencies and is not provided solely to bolster the DRF.267 The $50 
billion supplemental for Hurricane Sandy mandated a new reporting requirement. 
Congress required the FEMA Administrator to provide a monthly report of Hurricane 
Sandy-related DRF spending to both the House and Senate appropriations committees.268 
Chapter III described these reports in detail, and emphasized that while helpful to report 
annual FY spending under the DRF, these reports do not require FEMA or any other 
federal agency to develop an annual report on all disaster spending across the federal 
government, regardless of spending agency or funding source. 
G. DISINCENTIVES TO CHANGE 
The role of incentives was prevalent throughout this research study. Existing 
national disaster policy offers few incentives to reduce the amount the federal 
government spends on disasters annually. While incentives themselves are not prevalent, 
support for them has not diminished. Former FEMA Administrator Paulison promoted 
efforts to “build a more resilient country and shift more money into pre-disaster federal 
incentive programs.”269 States and tribal governments are not incentivized to invest in 
mitigation or preparedness activities at the risk of not receiving a declaration. Major 
disaster declarations are primarily based on damage assessments, which determine 
whether the state-level per capita damage indicator has been met, although other factors 
are considered.270 The annually adjusted per capita indicator has been criticized as 
unreasonably low and too easily met. This perspective, therefore, cites the artificially low 
damage threshold as a primary reason why the number of major declarations has 
increased. It means that disasters are becoming increasingly more federalized, and 
eligible for unlimited taxpayer dollars at 25% of the cost to states. No incentives tie 
Stafford Act declarations to increasing state investment prior to a disaster. If a state can 
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receive federal funds at one quarter of the cost, what incentive exists to spend state 
money prior to a declaration? A post-Hurricane Sandy report by the Heritage Foundation 
reflected the perceived resistance to change, stating, “The ambiguous provisions of the 
Stafford Act and low damages threshold create enormous incentives for governors to seek 
federal disaster declarations rather than shoulder most of the cost, especially during this 
time of tight state budgets.”271 
The method of budgeting for disasters remains a somewhat elusive yet important 
topic. Little momentum exists to change the process of issuing emergency disaster 
supplemental spending bills after a disaster. When a disaster occurs, and governors or 
tribal officials request federal funding to support the needs of their states, congressional 
representatives look reactive, responsible, compassionate, and altruistic when quickly 
passing an emergency spending bill. The fact that spending taxpayer dollars in this 
manner is common for disasters, and is also rife with criticism for its lack of 
accountability in the federal budget, is notwithstanding. Supplemental spending bills are 
often burdened with funding unrelated to the disaster, which drives up the spending of 
taxpayer dollars. The unpredictability of disasters means it cannot be guaranteed a need 
will exist for an extremely large amount of spending in any given year, perhaps reflecting 
the consistent underbudgeting for disasters. Congress has little incentive to change a 
process that benefits them and serves the needs of the impacted disaster population in 
their time of greatest need. Senator Coburn expressed this apparent disregard for a 
rigorous disaster budgeting process requiring fewer supplemental spending bills when he 
reflected on his failed 2012 amendment to revise the disaster declaration criteria. He 
stated, “At least some of the Senators voting against reforming the disaster declaration 
process were likely interested in ensuring that funds continue to go to their state, rather 
than focusing relief on the biggest emergencies and natural disasters.”272  
The GAO analyzed FEMA’s 1986 attempt to revise the per capita indicator, as 
well as other elements contributing to declaration decisions, in an attempt to reduce the 
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number of federal declarations. FEMA’s proposal included the state deductible approach 
recently proposed in January 2016, as well as a reduction in the federal cost share from 
the then- and current 75%, down to 50%. The GAO highlighted elected officials’ 
potential concern of losing discretionary authority with a change in the indicator. The 
GAO documented, “Rather than apply the empirical solution suggested by FEMA to 
perceived problems in the declaration process, Congress instead legislated a provision to 
explicitly forbid the primacy of any ‘arithmetic formula.’”273  
The former director of the Natural Hazards Center wrote, “Losses from hazards—
and the fact that the nation cannot seem to reduce them—result from shortsighted and 
narrow conceptions of the human relationship to the natural environment.”274 Dennis 
Mileti was arguing for increased hazard mitigation to reduce disaster impacts, reasoning 
that the inability to pursue long-term solution inhibits effective policy and sustainable 
disaster practices.275 Federal elected officials’ desire to retain the discretion inherent in 
the imprecise disaster budgeting process will most likely impede change. The focus on 
short-term disaster response solutions as opposed to long-term investment in disaster 
mitigation contributes to the continued increase in federal disaster spending.  
The current disaster funding system rewards all parties. Localities and states 
receive federal funds at a greatly reduced rate regardless of previous investment or 
mitigation efforts, individuals and businesses receive funding regardless of their 
insurance status, and federal officials benefit from perceived decisive action and altruism 
in awarding large emergency supplemental bills after a disaster, which suggest strong 
disincentives to changing the current funding mechanisms for disasters. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored federal government spending trends for major disaster 
declarations. Study findings revealed an overall trend of rising disaster spending and an 
absence of a comprehensive accounting for it, an expanded federal role in disasters, an 
increase in the quantity of declarations issued, and drastic under-budgeting for disaster 
events that impact communities each year. Additional findings demonstrated a need for 
the federal government to examine its policies with regard to risk management, housing 
insurance, disaster damage threshold, federal cost share in disasters, sliding scale disaster 
relief funding, and intra-state resource sharing. Recommendations are provided for 
policymakers that address each of these findings. The section concludes with an appeal to 
assess the future of taxpayer-funded disaster response and recovery by incentivizing the 
management of risk. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Seven approaches are recommended for policymakers to diminish the upward 
trend of federal spending on disasters.  
1. Mandate an Annual Report of All Federal Disaster Spending 
Congress should require one agency to develop an annual report of all federal 
department and agency spending on disasters, regardless of source. FEMA submits a 
cumulative monthly report to Congress on DRF spending, and the last report of each 
fiscal year is a good source for initial data for this report. Other existing reports that can 
be used as source material include annual DRF regular budget appropriations, 
congressional supplemental disaster appropriations, individual department and agency 
budget in brief reports, agency spending reports if available, and any other data as 
needed. Until the government and its citizens have an understanding of the full extent of 
federal disaster spending, the trend of increasing the expenditure of taxpayer dollars is 
unlikely to change. 
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2. Develop a National Risk Management Approach 
The nation must reexamine its approach to national risk management, which 
means looking at the full range of emergency management mission areas including 
disaster preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation to determine 
national priorities. The vast majority of disaster funding is spent responding to an event 
rather than for efforts toward preventing an incident or lessening potential damage. This 
nation’s vision of addressing a problem afterwards, by providing the majority of disaster 
funding for response, must be altered to reflect a systems approach. Investment in 
mitigation projects and preparedness activities impacts disaster damage severity and 
response and recovery capabilities. A public dialogue must occur concerning how 
taxpayer money should be spent on disasters. The development of a national approach to 
risk management would outline a strategy to prioritize investments and maximize 
resource allocation. 
3. Privatize Housing Insurance 
The federal government should develop a multi-year plan to withdraw from 
providing flood insurance to homeowners. Coastal areas should be the initial focus, as the 
majority of DRF funding over the past 20 years has been for hurricanes. The private 
sector is not incentivized to offer insurance while it is available from the federal 
government. Removing the federal government from providing this insurance promotes a 
free market economy where true risk is incorporated into homeowner costs. The 
government should work with the private insurance industry to incentivize homeowners 
not only to purchase insurance, but to have the appropriate level of coverage depending 
on the community risk level. The government must stop subsidizing personal risk and 
debatable land development practices at the expense of taxpayers. 
4. Analyze the Use of Total Taxable Resources or Revise the per Capita 
Damage Indicator 
The GAO should analyze disaster data for the most recent 10-year period, at a 
minimum, to determine the impact of instituting TTR in place of the per capita damage 
indicator. This analysis would help to inform state interests, federal elected officials, and 
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the public of the benefits and drawbacks of considering the TTR as a new tool for 
determining state-level major disaster declaration eligibility. In parallel, Congress should 
increase the per capita damage threshold to reflect economic conditions and income 
levels. If the indicator continues to be raised only to match inflation, an increasing 
number of disasters will become eligible for major disaster declarations. This increase 
will maintain the upward trend of increased federal disaster spending indicated by this 
study, and the federal government will pay 75% of the cost of an ever-increasing number 
of disasters. 
5. Lower the Federal Cost Share Percentage 
Congress should propose a Stafford Act amendment to reduce the guaranteed 
federal cost percentage from 75% to 50%. This amendment would require increased state 
investment in disaster preparedness or mitigation, or may initiate the states’ creation of a 
disaster “rainy day” fund to pay for disasters that occur in their state. The combination of 
reduced federal expenditure mandates and increased state investment will reduce federal 
taxpayer spending for disasters. 
6. Provide Federal Funding on a Sliding Scale 
Congress should propose an amendment to the Stafford Act to provide federal 
disaster funding based on a sliding scale. Each disaster receives the same baseline of 75% 
federal cost share regardless of the frequency of disaster occurrence, level of state 
investment in mitigation, preparedness, or prevention activities, or saturation of 
homeowners with the appropriate level of insurance. The federal government has no cap 
with regard to what it can or will pay to aid a state as a result of a disaster, and a state has 
every incentive to ask for a declaration. Whether a state has made investments in 
protection of critical infrastructure, mitigation projects, or disaster preparedness, the lure 
of repairing assets in the affected state with federal funds at 25% of the cost could prove 
too great for state economies with tight budgets. FEMA is currently considering a disaster 
deductible to incentivize states to invest more in mitigation and preparedness, and foster 
responsible land development in hazard areas. The intent is also to encourage states to set 
aside monies to fund their own disasters as opposed to relying on federal assistance. 
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Whether funding is provided on a sliding scale or a deductible basis, federal disaster 
funding should be reframed to meet the intent described in the Stafford Act, to 
supplement state and local efforts. 
7. Increase Incentives for State-to-State Resource Sharing 
The federal government should incentivize states to increase the utilization of the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) for state-to-state use of resources. 
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has issued billions of dollars in 
preparedness grants. Individuals, teams, and communities across the country have 
invested those funds in training and equipment to establish, maintain, and enhance the 
knowledge and skills necessary to respond to a disaster. The investment the federal 
government has made in state capability growth should be capitalized upon to underscore 
the importance of federal grants to states, utilize highly skilled teams and support their 
ongoing skills maintenance and application, and emphasize a distributed emergency 
management skillset across the country as opposed to top-heavy federalized assets. 
Finally, putting an incentive into place for increased state–to–state resource utilization 
could reduce the increasing trend of FEMA administrative costs. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The research studied 20-year trends in spending under the DRF. The principal 
finding concurred with existing literature that federal disaster spending continued to 
increase. Recommendations to reverse this trend include developing an annual report of 
all federal disaster spending regardless of source, creating a national risk management 
strategy, reducing the federal cost share under the Stafford Act, raising the per capita 
damage threshold, eliminating government flood insurance, funding disasters on a sliding 
scale, and incentivizing state resource sharing. These changes would address the primary 
issue of rising federal disaster spending undertaken in this research. Future research must 
address the philosophical debate of incentivizing risk management over disaster 
management, and to what extent taxpayers should continue to pay for disaster damages 
with federal funds. 
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